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Abstract
Simulations of forward guidance in rational expectations models should be
assessed using the “modest interventions” framework introduced by Eric Leeper
and Tao Zha. That is, the estimated effects of a policy intervention should be con-
sidered reliable only if that intervention is unlikely to trigger a revision in private
sector beliefs about the way that policy will be conducted. I show how to constrain
simulations of forward guidance to ensure that they are regarded as modest policy
interventions and illustrate the technique using a medium-scale DSGE model es-
timated on US data. I find that, in many cases, experiments that generate the large
responses of macroeconomic variables that many economists deem implausible –
the so-called “forward guidance puzzle” – would not be viewed as modest policy
interventions by the agents in the model. Those experiments should therefore be
treated with caution, since they may prompt agents to believe that there has been
a change in the monetary policy regime that is not accounted for within the model.
More reliable results can be obtained by constraining the experiment to be a mod-
est policy intervention. The quantitative effects on macroeconomic variables are
more plausible in these cases.
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1 Introduction
Simulations of announcements about the prospective path of monetary policy (‘for-
ward guidance’) in rational expectations models should be assessed using the “mod-
est interventions” approach of Leeper and Zha (2003). That is, the estimated effects
of a policy intervention should be considered reliable only if that intervention is un-
likely to trigger a revision in private sector beliefs about the way that policy will be
conducted. In contrast, estimates obtained from experiments that are not modest pol-
icy interventions may be unreliable because the single-regime rational expectations
models typically used for monetary policy analysis not allow for the effects of shifts in
agents’ beliefs about the prevailing monetary policy regime.
In this paper, I apply the Leeper-Zha framework to simulations of announced paths
for the policy rate in single-regime dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models with rational expectations. Using an estimated DSGE model of the US econ-
omy, I show that constraining forward guidance experiments to be modest policy in-
terventions influences the estimated effects on macroeconomic variables. In partic-
ular, constraining the experiments to be modest policy interventions eliminates the
extremely large estimates of the macroeconomic effects reported in many recent pa-
pers. However, my model can reproduce these extreme results if I do not constrain the
forward guidance experiment to be a modest policy intervention. This suggests that
recent estimates may be unreliable because they are not modest policy interventions.
I focus on the task of a policy advisor asked to provide estimates of the macroe-
conomic effects of forward guidance. Specifically, the policy advisor estimates the
effects of the central bank announcing a planned path for the policy instrument that is
fully believed by private agents.1 The policy advisor uses a “New Keynesian” DSGE
model (featuring optimizing forward-looking households and firms, explicitly mod-
eled nominal rigidities and rational expectations) of the type commonly used to study
monetary policy by academics and policymakers.2
To assess whether the experiment represents a modest policy intervention, I extend
the framework developed by Adolfson et al. (2005) to measure modest interventions
in DSGE models. I show how to simulate forward guidance under the assumption
that the experiment is modest policy intervention. In some cases, it may be impossible
to implement a modest policy intervention that delivers precisely the desired path for
the policy rate. In those cases, I show how to implement a modest intervention that
produces a path for the instrument that is as close as possible to the desired path.
I illustrate my technique using a variant of the Smets and Wouters (2007) medium-
scale DSGE model, extended to include ‘policy news shocks’ that capture anticipated
future changes in the Fed funds rate. These shocks represent the mechanism through
which policymakers can provide guidance about the likely future path of monetary
policy. The model is estimated on US data using data from 1984Q1–2008Q4. The
sample period is chosen to exclude the recent period during which the Fed funds rate
has been at the zero bound.
I use the model to conduct policy experiments in which the Fed funds rate is
1As noted in Section 2, not all forward guidance is intended to communicate a particular path for
the policy rate. So this experiment is not necessarily the most appropriate for estimating the effects all
forms of forward guidance.
2Many central banks use at least one model of this type as part of their policy analysis and forecast-
ing processes. See Tovar (2008) for a review of how DSGE models are used at central banks.
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held lower than the model-based forecast. The results of these experiments generate
macroeconomic effects that most policymakers (and their advisors) would regard as
implausibly large. This result is consistent with several previous studies documenting
that, in this class of models, the announcement of a fully credible path for the short-
term nominal interest rate can generate macroeconomic effects that most economists
would regard as implausibly large (see, for example, Weale (2013)). This result is la-
beled the “forward guidance puzzle” by del Negro et al. (2012). I show that, from the
perspective of agents in the model, these policy experiments do not represent modest
policy interventions. So the predictions of extremely large effects of forward guidance
are likely to be unreliable.
When I constrain the policy experiments so that agents in the model would regard
them as modest policy interventions, the macroeconomic effects are greatly reduced.
In many cases, the path for the Fed funds rate that delivers a modest policy interven-
tion is very similar to the desired path that the policy advisor is asked to simulate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I briefly explain
the nature of the ‘forward guidance puzzle’. In Section 3, I introduce my methodology
for measuring the ‘modesty’ of a forward guidance experiment and restricting an im-
modest policy intervention to be modest. In Section 4, I present an empirical exercise
using the medium-scale estimated DSGE model. In Section 5, I examine the simula-
tions in more detail to shed light on the underlying mechanisms that determine the
results. Section 6 examines the robustness of my findings to two important assump-
tions: the way that the modesty of the policy experiment is measured; and the extent
to which the estimated policy rule captures behavior from a stable monetary policy
regime.
2 Forward guidance and estimates of its effects
Over the past decade, many central banks have explored ways to provide more in-
formation about how their assessments of the economy and of the appropriate way
to achieve their policy objectives are likely to affect the future path for their mone-
tary policy instruments. Such ‘forward guidance’ comes in many forms, ranging from
qualitative descriptions of the key judgments underpinning policy discussions, to ex-
plicit projections of the policy instrument under alternative assumptions about the
nature of the shocks hitting the economy.3
As noted by Woodford (2012), interest in the use of explicit forward guidance has
increased in recent years. In part this is because many central banks reduced their
policy rates to their effective lower bounds in response to the financial crisis, limiting
the scope for further cuts in the policy rate.4 The objectives of recent forward guidance
(and the methods by which they have been communicated) are varied. In some cases,
the guidance has been intended to clarify the stance of monetary policy that policy-
makers think is appropriate.5 In other cases, the purpose of the guidance has been to
3See the Appendix in Monetary Policy Committee (2013) for a review of alternative forms of for-
ward guidance and den Haan (2013) for commentary and analysis of the forward guidance policies
implemented by the major central banks.
4Of course, many central banks have also responded by increasing the range of policy instruments
to include so-called unconventional monetary policy tools. See Borio and Disyatat (2010) for a review
of these policies.
5See, for example, Woodford (2012, Section 1.2).
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clarify the nature of the monetary policy reaction function.6
2.1 Existing estimates and the “forward guidance puzzle”
Alongside the continual development of forward guidance strategies by central banks,
economists have studied the effects of forward guidance in a variety of rational expec-
tations models. Recent papers have assessed the effects of forward guidance using
linearized New Keynesian DSGE models. These papers have studied experiments in
which the policymaker announces that the policy rate will follow a particular path for
a finite number of periods, thereafter being set in accordance with the monetary policy
rule embedded in the model.
Specifically, the experiments assume that the monetary policy reaction function
takes the following form:
rt = f (xt,Etxt+1, xt−1) + rt (1)
where r denotes the log-deviation of the (gross) nominal interest rate from steady
state and f is a linear function of the vector of endogenous variables in the model
(x) which may enter contemporaneously, as lags or as expected future values, where
E denotes the expectations operator.7 The term rt represents an exogenous shock to
the policy rule. The experiment proceeds by computing a sequence of shocks {rt+i},
i = 0, . . . , K − 1 that, when fully anticipated by agents in the model, ensure that the policy
instrument will follow the desired path for K periods (in the absence of the arrival of
other shocks).8
This experiment has been conducted in both small-scale calibrated New Keynesian
models and larger-scale estimated models of the type commonly used for forecasting
and policy analysis at central banks. The results of these experiments in both sets of
models have been striking: for example, for a common calibration of the prototypical
New Keynesian model, Carlstrom et al. (2012) show than an eight quarter reduction
in the policy rate by 4% can generate an immediate rise in annualized inflation of
around 50%.9 Carlstrom et al. (2012) and Lase´en and Svensson (2011) document very
large responses in, respectively, the Smets and Wouters (2007) model and the RAM-
SES DSGE model used at the Riksbank.10 Indeed, these papers also demonstrate that
both of these models can generate (large) falls in output and inflation in response to
an anticipated reduction in the policy rate.11 So the effects of these experiments on
6See, for example, Yellen (2012) and Bean (2013).
7The form of the policy rule (1) is not restrictive for the argument presented here: longer leads and
lags can be included in the rule without altering the conclusions.
8For linear models, the solution is identical to taking a ‘stacked time’ approach in which the struc-
tural equations for the first K periods (with the policy rate treated as exogenous) are stacked together
with the rational expectations solution of the model for period K + 1 onwards. See Carlstrom et al.
(2012) for an example of this type of approach.
9Blake (2012) and Levin et al. (2010) have also shown that this experiment generates implausible
results in the same prototypical New Keynesian model (as developed by, for example, Woodford (2003)
and Galı´ (2009)).
10The RAMSES model is described by Adolfson et al. (2007).
11Carlstrom et al. (2012) show that one reason for this result is the presence of lagged state variables.
For example, they demonstrate that the simple three-equation New Keynesian model can exhibit this
behavior if price setting includes indexation to past inflation, so that a lag of inflation appears in the
Phillips curve.
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macroeconomic variables are thus typically regarded as implausibly large and some-
times counter-intuitive in their sign.
del Negro et al. (2012, p16–17) label the implausible responses to such simulations
as the “forward guidance puzzle”:
[T]he apparently straightforward experiment “let us fix the short term
interest rate to x percent for K periods” has implications for the short term
rate that go well beyond the K-th period in medium scale DSGE models.
As a consequence, these counterfactuals appear to have an over-sized effect
on the macroeconomy.
Broadly speaking, the emergence of the puzzle has led to two lines of inquiry. In
the context of the prototypical New Keynesian model it is possible to characterize the
behavior of the model analytically.12 This has enabled analysis of the features of the
model structure that give rise to the implausible effects. For example, Levin et al.
(2010) show that, for this simple model, the behavior of output and inflation when
the interest rate is held fixed is determined by the size of the unstable eigenvalue of
the transition matrix mapping the vector of current inflation and output gap to the
vector of next period’s inflation and output gap. The size of the unstable eigenvalue
is determined by the product of the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and
the interest elasticity of demand. This type of analytical investigation has led to sug-
gestions of how the underlying microfoundations of the model could be modified to
eliminate the puzzling results. For example, Kiley (2014) argues that the ‘sticky infor-
mation’ assumption delivers more plausible results than the standard New Keynesian
assumption of sticky prices.
The second line of inquiry is to investigate whether the nature of the experiment
can be modified to deliver more plausible results. del Negro et al. (2012) argue that
the magnitudes of movements in long-term interest rates generated in their experi-
ments are somewhat larger than the daily moves in US long-term rates on the days on
which the FOMC issued significant forward guidance announcements. A persistently
lower path for the nominal interest rate combined with a large initial rise in inflation
creates a significant initial fall in the long-term real interest rate, which stimulates de-
mand and validates the short-term rise in inflation. del Negro et al. (2012) therefore
suggest a modification to the experiment in which the shocks to the monetary policy
rule are used to deliver a particular change in the long-term interest rate as well as to
influence the path of the policy rate over the near term. Haberis et al. (2014) allow the
announcement that the policy rate will follow a particular path to be imperfectly credi-
ble. In this case, the magnitude of the responses to the experiment can be substantially
dampened, even if the degree of imperfect credibility is very small.
A common feature of all of the experiments documented above is that they are in-
terpreted as anticipated deviations from the systematic component of monetary policy
(ie the function f in equation (1)). Indeed, this type of deviation from usual behavior
has been advocated when the policy rate hits the lower bound. Forward guidance
could in this case be interpreted as a commitment by the policymaker to hold the pol-
icy rate at the zero bound for longer than would be implied by adherence to the mon-
etary policy reaction function that it typically follows (sometimes called a ‘lower for
12See for, example, Blake (2012), Carlstrom et al. (2012) and Levin et al. (2010).
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longer’ strategy).13 Committing to a deliberate deviation from normal policy behavior
has been labeled “Odyssean forward guidance” by Campbell et al. (2012).
In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation.
2.2 Modest policy interventions
The experiments documented in the previous section are interpreted a commitment
by the policymaker to temporarily behave in an abnormal manner before returning to
the normal conduct of monetary policy. Leeper and Zha (2003) show, however, that
experiments of this nature may generate unreliable results in many rational expecta-
tions models. That is because a significant change in policy behavior is likely to shift
agents’ beliefs about the way that policy will be conducted in the future. In the ex-
periments discussed in Section 2.1, such effects are ruled out by assumption because
monetary policy is described by a single regime (the policy rule). As Leeper and Zha
(2003, p1676) note: “Treating regime changes as surprises that will never occur again
ascribes to the public beliefs about policy that are inconsistent with actual behavior –
the government takes actions that the public thought were impossible.” This critique
can be applied to the experiments reviewed in Section 2.1 because, in these cases, for-
ward guidance represents a temporary regime change (during the period that policy
behaves ‘abnormally’).
Of course, a broader range of policy experiments can be contemplated in a richer
setup. For example, Cooley et al. (1984) argue in favor of a model in which systematic
policy behavior may change over time, with ‘regime shifts’ governed by a well-defined
probability model. This expands the probability space over which agents form expec-
tations, enabling rational expectations to be defined in a way that supports a broader
range of policy experiments. This approach can be extended to environments of imper-
fect information. If agents do not perfectly observe the prevailing regime (only a noisy
signal conferred by policy actions and statements), then they will apply a Bayesian
learning procedure to form their view of the prevailing regime. Indeed, Leeper and
Zha (2003) use a model of this type to illustrate the concept of “modest policy inter-
ventions” that I use in this paper.
Explicitly including the possibility of regime changes increases the size and com-
plexity of any given model and, in practice, the scale of models typically used for
policy analysis and forecasting in central banks precludes this.14 As an alternative,
Leeper and Zha (2003) argue that even a single-regime model can be used to examine
“modest policy interventions” if it is estimated using a sample of data in which the
policy regime did not change. Such a model is misspecified because it does not allow
agents to revise their beliefs about the prevailing monetary policy regime.
However, Leeper and Zha (2003) define a “modest intervention” as a change in the
policy instrument that does not prompt a change in agents’ beliefs about the way that
13The motivation is that even if the short-term interest rate is constrained by the lower bound,
forward-looking agents anticipate that future monetary policy will be looser than would usually be
expected, reducing longer-term interest rates and stimulating demand in the near term. Arguments in
favor of such a strategy are often based on the observation that, in simple New Keynesian models, the
policy rate associated with the optimal commitment policy stays at the lower bound for longer than the
optimal path under discretion, delivering better stabilization of the output gap and inflation. See, for
example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
14Encouragingly, recent work by Bianchi and Melosi (2013) suggests that building and estimating
relatively large-scale models under these assumptions may be feasible in the near future.
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policy is conducted. Given the assumption that agents expect policy to be conducted
in line with recent behavior, such a policy experiment is likely to provide a good es-
timate of its effects. In contrast, policy experiments that are not regarded as modest
interventions may generate “expectation-formation effects” as agents revise their view
of the prevailing policy regime. These expectation-formation effects are not captured
in the policy advisor’s misspecified (single-regime) model, but can play a material
role in the determination of the true rational expectations responses to a policy inter-
vention. This means that policymakers (and their advisors) should be cautious of the
results of policy experiments that would not be interpreted as modest policy interven-
tions by agents in the model.
Leeper and Zha (2003) show how to test whether a policy experiment is likely to
be regarded as a modest policy intervention by agents in the model. Loosely speak-
ing, an intervention is modest if agents judge that the effects of that intervention are
sufficiently similar to those typically observed under the prevailing policy regime.
The interpretation of forward guidance as a modest policy intervention chimes
with some policymaker’s descriptions of the rationale for their policies. For example,
when discussing the forward guidance policy introduced in August 2013 by the Bank
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, Bean (2013) notes that:
This guidance is intended primarily to clarify our reaction function and
thus make policy more effective, rather than to inject additional stimulus
by pre-committing to a time-inconsistent lower for longer policy path in
the manner of Woodford (2012).
This implies that this forward guidance policy was regarded as consistent with pre-
vious policy behavior rather than as a temporary period of abnormal behavior consis-
tent with an Odyssean interpretation of the forward guidance strategy.
3 Forward guidance as a modest policy intervention
In this section I describe my approach for simulating forward guidance as a modest
policy intervention. I consider the case in which a policy advisor is asked to estimated
the effects of providing a signal to private agents about the future path of the policy
instrument. I assume that the policy advisor uses a DSGE model estimated over a
stable policy regime. I also assume that policy advisor uses a DSGE model that is
linear in terms of variables measured as log-deviations from steady state.15 Although
the model is estimated over a period in which the policy regime has not changed, it
is misspecified. That is because, as described previously, the model incorporates the
assumption that agents believe that the probability of a policy regime change is zero.
Since agents do not place any probability of policy behavior shifting to a new regime,
only policy experiments that are consistent with agents’ beliefs about policy behavior
during the estimation period are likely to generate reliable estimates.
15I restrict attention to linearized models because most DSGE models used for forecasting and policy
analysis at central banks are linearized, presumably because this facilitates their use for such experi-
ments, given their size.
7
3.1 The monetary policy rule
A fundamental difference between my analysis and the experiments discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1 is the interpretation of the monetary policy rule within the policy advisor’s
model. In the studies discussed previously, the shock rt to the monetary policy rule
(1) is interpreted (explicitly or otherwise) as a deviation from the policymaker’s sys-
tematic response (the function f (·)) to developments in the economy. In contrast, I
regard the monetary policy rule (1) as the policy advisor’s model of private agents’
beliefs about systematic monetary policy.
I assume that the monetary policy rule has the same generic form as equation (1).
However, the disturbance to the rule is assumed to follow a particular stochastic pro-
cess
rt = ρr
r
t−1 +
J−1∑
j=0
σν,jν
r
j,t−j (2)
This formulation of policy behavior means that, in each period, information about
the future setting of the policy rate is revealed, which is the mechanism through which
policymakers may influence expectations of the future path of the policy instrument.
This mechanism is captured within the policy advisor’s model of private agents be-
liefs in the form of the disturbances {νrj,t}J−1j=0 . Here νrj,t−j represents a j period ahead
disturbance to the policy rule that is revealed in period t − j. Thus signals about pol-
icy made in period t − j affect the policy rate in period t. I assume that all shocks
νr are normally distributed with unit variance, so that σν,j > 0 measure the standard
deviation of these disturbances.
Milani and Treadwell (2012) estimate a model with this type of policy disturbance,
naming the νrj,t−j terms as “policy news shocks”.16 Campbell et al. (2012) use a rule
with disturbances of this form to analyze ‘Odyssean’ forward guidance over future
policy in terms of the νrj,t−j terms. However, as noted in Section 2.1, they interpret
policy news shocks as anticipated deviations from the policymaker’s usual behavior,
interpreted as the function f (·) in equation (1). In contrast, I interpret {νrj,t−j}J−1j=0 in
terms of the policy advisor’s model of private agents’ beliefs about monetary policy.
The policy advisor’s model of agents’ true beliefs is imperfect (in particular, because
it does not incorporate the possibility that agents may ascribe some probability to a
regime change). This interpretation is crucial, because although agents in the model
are assumed to treat {νrj,t−j}J−1j=0 as stochastic, they are in fact part of the systematic
component of actual policy behavior. As such, they can be treated as choice variables
by the policymaker and the policy advisor, as explained by Leeper and Zha (2003).
This interpretation may seem odd to some readers, but Sims (2011, p3) notes that it
can be rationalized from a Bayesian perspective:
From the perspective of a policy maker, her own choices are not “ran-
dom”, and confronting her with a model in which her past choices are
treated as “random” and her available current choices are treated as draws
from a probability distribution may confuse or annoy her. Indeed economists
who provide policy advice and view probability from a frequentist per-
spective may themselves find this framework puzzling. A Bayesian per-
spective on inference makes no distinction between random and non-random
objects. It distinguishes known or already observed objects from unknown
16Hirose and Kurozumi (2011) and del Negro et al. (2013) also augment their policy rule in this way.
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objects. The latter have probability distributions, characterizing our uncer-
tainty about them. There is therefore no paradox in supposing that econo-
metricians and the public may have probability distributions over policy
maker behavior, while policy makers themselves do not see their choices
as random. The problem of econometric modeling for policy advice is
to use the historically estimated joint distribution of policy behavior and
economic outcomes to construct accurate probability distributions for out-
comes conditional on contemplated policy actions not yet taken.
As noted, for the policy advisor, equations (1) and (2) describe an approximate
model of agents’ beliefs about monetary policy behavior. The quality of this approxi-
mation to the true probability model of agents in the actual economy will be important
for the robustness of the results based on my procedure.
3.2 The model-based forecast
The set of equations in the model – including the policy rule (1) and the policy news
process (2) – can be written as:
HB (θ)xt−1 +HC (θ)xt +HF (θ)Etxt+1 = Ψ (θ) zt
where the vector z captures the shocks which are independently normally distributed,
with unit variance: zt ∼ N (0, I). The vector xt contains all of the endogenous variables
in the model, including the policy instrument rt and the forcing process rt that enters
the monetary policy rule (1).
The matrices of coefficients (HB, HC and HF ) depend on a vector of parameters
θ describing preferences and technology in the underlying model. From this point, I
assume that the parameter vector θ is fixed and treated as known by the policy advisor.
However, the analysis that follows could be easily extended to account for uncertainty
about θ, for example by repeating the policy experiment using a set of draws from an
estimated distribution of θ.
The rational expectations solution of the model can be written as:
xt = Bxt−1 + Φzt (3)
where the fact that the coefficient matrices B and Φ depend on the parameter vector θ
has been suppressed for notational convenience.
The shocks zt are partitioned as
zt ≡
[
ηt
νt
]
where η denotes the vector of non-policy shocks and ν collects the vector of policy
news shocks:
νt ≡

νr0,t
νr1,t
...
νrJ−1,t

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The matrix Φ can be partitioned in a conformable manner and and the rational
expectations solution (3) written as:
xt = Bxt−1 + Φηηt + Φννt (4)
The policy advisor uses data for a set of observable variables over the sample t =
1, . . . , T to form a baseline forecast from the model over the period T + 1, . . . , T +
H . To produce this baseline forecast, the transition equation equation (4) is projected
forward from an estimate of the current state vector, denoted xT |T . This estimate can
be produced using the Kalman filter together with a set of measurement equations
linking the state vector x to a set of observable variables.17 The projection at horizon
h ∈ {1, . . . , H} is given by:
ETxT+h = BhxT |T (5)
3.3 Policy experiments
The model-based forecast is based on the assumption that agents expect future shocks
to be zero. In particular, the policy advisor’s model of agents’ beliefs implies that
agents expect the policy news shocks at date T + 1 to be zero (ETνj,T+1 = 0,∀j =
0, ..., J − 1).18 To study the implications of a particular path for the instrument, the
policy advisor chooses a particular vector of policy news shocks ν¯j,T+1, j = 0, ..., J − 1.
The vector is chosen to implement a particular projection for the policy instrument,
computed using the methods shown below. This experiment is interpreted as an an-
nouncement of future policy intentions that is communicated to agents at the point at
which they make their decisions in period T + 1.
The vector of policy news shocks chosen by the policy advisor generates a new
forecast given by
x¯T+h = B
h−1 (BxT |T + Φν ν¯T+1)
The difference between the forecast under forward guidance and the model-based
projection is:
x¯T+h − ETxT+h = Bh−1Φν ν¯T+1
The policy advisor wishes to assess whether the result of the policy intervention
ν¯T+1 would be regarded by agents in the model as consistent with a modest policy
intervention. To do this, the policy advisor considers the effects on a particular set of
variables. Specifically, suppose that the variables of interest are given by
yt = Qxt + Aωt (6)
where ωt ∼ N (0, I) is a vector of iid measurement errors. Then the effect of the policy
intervention on the forecasts for these variables is given by:19
y¯T+h − ETyT+h = Q [x¯T+h − ETxT+h] (7)
17The details of the measurement equation are unimportant for the exposition of the technique, but
in the empirical exercises presented in Section 4, the measurement equations are made explicit.
18Of course, the expected path for the policy rate in the model-based forecast will be affected by
policy news shocks that arrived within the sample period. For example, νJ−1,T−1 is part of agents’
information set at date T and will affect date-T expectations of the policy rate in period T + J − 2.
19Forecasts of measurement errors satisfy ETωT+h = 0,∀h ≥ 1.
10
To assess whether agents are likely to regard this effect as the result of a modest
policy intervention, I use the multivariate modesty statistic developed by Adolfson
et al. (2005). They show how to test whether the change in the forecast is statistically
likely with respect to the distribution of outcomes implied by the assumed probability
model for νT+1.20 Adolfson et al. (2005) propose that if y contains ny variables, then
the following test statistic should be compared against critical values from a χ2 (ny)
distribution:
MhT = [y¯T+h − ETyT+h]′Ω−1T+h [y¯T+h − ETyT+h] (8)
where Ωt+h = QPT+h|TQ′ + AA′ and P is computed using the following recursion:21
PT+h|T = BPT+h−1|TB′ (9)
with PT+1|T = PT |T + ΦνΦ′ν .
Adolfson et al. (2005) note that if the structure of the model is such that the his-
tory of observable variables is sufficient to uniquely identify the state vector xT |T , then
the iterations for the P matrix will start from PT |T = 0. However, the inclusion of
the policy news shocks means that the conditions under which this is true will gener-
ally not apply in my case. That is, the “poor man’s invertibility condition’ discussed
by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2007) is violated if the number of shocks exceeds the
number of observable variables, which is very likely in applications of my approach.
In this case, the initialization for PT |T can be computed from the Kalman smoother.
The inclusion of policy news shocks also means that the multivariate modesty statistic
can typically be computed for a larger set of variables than in Adolfson et al. (2005),
because the rank of P is equal to the number of policy news shocks (that is, the dimen-
sion of νT+1).
Written in terms of the shocks used to implement the policy intervention, the mod-
esty statistic is:
MhT =
[
QBh−1Φν ν¯T+1
]′
Ω−1T+h
[
QBh−1Φν ν¯T+1
]
(10)
or
MhT = ν¯
′
T+1Wν¯T+1 (11)
where W ≡ Φ′ν (B′)h−1Q′Ω−1T+hQBh−1Φν . The weighting matrix W is a function only of
the parameters of the model and does not depend on ν¯T+1
The preceding analysis has shown how to test whether a particular shock vector
ν¯T+1 would be regarded as a modest policy intervention by agents in the model. I
now turn to the task of computing a shock vector that delivers a desired path for the
policy instrument. Specifically, I assume that the policy advisor is asked to estimate
the effects of an announcement that ensures that private agents’ expectations of the
policy rate follow a particular path for periods T + 1, . . . , T +K, with K ≤ J .
I assume that the policy advisor uses the first j = 1, . . . , n policy news shocks
(with K ≤ n ≤ J) to implement the policy experiment.22 This enables me to compare
20Adolfson et al. (2005) focus on ‘constant interest rate projections’ generated by a model-based fore-
cast constrained so that the projection of policy-relevant variables meet particular target criteria under
the assumption that the policy rate remains fixed over some horizon. Those forecasts are different from
the policy simulations considered in my paper because they use the target criteria for policy-relevant
variables to compute the required (constant) path for the policy rate.
21The recursion presented by Adolfson et al. (2005) contains an additional term that captures the
effect of unanticipated shocks over the forecast horizon. This term is absent from my formulation because
the shocks used to implement the policy experiment are revealed in period T + 1.
22I assume ν¯T+1,j = 0 for j = n+ 1, . . . , J .
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alternative approaches for implementing the policy experiment, including those used
in almost all of the previous studies discussed in Section 2.1. From the perspective
of the model, the most natural approach would be to set n = J . But most existing
analyses of such policy experiments choose n = K.
Let the K × 1 vector for the desired path of the policy rate be denoted r¯ and let Sr
be the selector matrix that isolates the row of x corresponding to the policy rate. The
shocks that deliver the desired path for the policy instrument must satisfy:
r¯ = Rν¯T+1 + c
where
R =

SrΦν
SrBΦν
...
SrB
h−1Φν
...
SrB
K−1Φν

and c represents the model-based projection for the instrument, given by
c =

SrBxT |T
SrB
2xT |T
...
SrB
hxT |T
...
SrB
KxT |T

For the case in which n > K there are many vectors ν¯T+1 that can be chosen to
impose the desired path for the policy rate. I consider three approaches to finding a
vector ν¯T+1.
Method 1: least squares solution
The first method chooses the shocks to minimize the sum of their squared values. The
minimization problem is:
min
1
2
ν¯ ′T+1ν¯T+1 − λ′ (Rν¯T+1 + c− r¯)
which has the solution:
ν¯∗ = R′ (RR′)−1 (r¯ − c) (12)
This vector may or may not imply that the policy intervention is modest. This can
be assessed by evaluating the test statistic (11) using the shock vector computed using
(12) with the relevant χ2 critical value. Methods 2 and 3 allow the policy advisor to
constrain the experiment to be modest.
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Method 2: the minimum distance solution
If the value of MhT evaluated using ν
∗ implies that the experiment conducted using
Method 1 does not represent a modest policy intervention, then the new projection for
the variables of interest may be unreliable. In the case when n = K, ν∗ is the unique
vector of shocks that ensures that the policy rate is expected to follow the desired path.
In this case, the policy advisor can find a shock vector that delivers a projection for the
policy rate that is as close to the desired path as possible, but would still be considered
to be a modest policy intervention from the perspective of agents in the model.
The minimization problem in this case is:
min (Rν¯T+1 + c− r¯)′ (Rν¯T+1 + c− r¯)
subject to:
ν¯ ′T+1Wν¯T+1 − M¯ = 0
where M¯ is the target value of the modesty statistic imposed by the policy advisor.
This value can be chosen by computing the critical value of the relevant χ2 distribution
used to evaluate the modesty statistic for an ‘acceptable’ p-value. For example, the
advisor may judge that a p-value of 0.05 is sufficient to ensure that the intervention is
considered modest by the agents in the model.
The minimization problem is a quadratically constrained quadratic programming
(QCQP) problem that can be solved using a variety of numerical methods. A common
issue with numerical search procedures of this type is that they may converge to local
minima. A heuristic approach to guard against this is to start the optimizer from a
number of distinct initial conditions.
This method can also be applied to the case in which the the test statistic MhT evalu-
ated at ν∗ is sufficiently small that the policy experiment implemented using Method 1
is judged to be a modest policy intervention. Then the policy advisor can use Method 2
to deliver an expected path for the policy instrument that is as close to the desired path
as possible, but generates macroeconomic effects that are as unlikely as possible, sub-
ject to the constraint that agents in the model would still regarded the experiment as a
modest policy intervention. We would expect an experiment implemented in this way
to generate larger effects on the variables of interest, so this may be a useful approach
if a policy advisor wants to explore the range of possible macroeconomic effects of the
experiment.23
Method 3: the modesty-constrained solution
When n ≥ K, there will be many shock vectors that implement the desired path for
the policy instrument. This means that the policy advisor can find a set of shocks that
delivers the desired path and ensures that the experiment is considered modest by
agents in the model. In practice, this means incorporating a constraint to ensure that
the modesty statistic attains a particular critical value of the relevant χ2 distribution,
denoted M¯ .
23However, in general, there is not a direct correlation between the size of the effects on the variables
of interest and the extent to which the policy experiment is considered to be a modest policy interven-
tion. This is demonstrated in Section 4.4.
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To implement this method, I specify another QCQP problem, given by:
minS (ν¯T+1) ≡ (Dν¯T+1 −Dν¯∗)′Σ−1
(
D¯νT+1 −Dν¯∗
)
(13)
subject to:
Rν¯T+1 + (c− r¯) = 0
ν¯ ′T+1Wν¯T+1 − M¯ = 0
where, again, M¯ is the target value of the modesty statistic imposed by the policy
advisor.24 The matrices D and Σ are: D = QBh−1Φν and Σ = DD′ −DR′ (RR′)−1RD′.
Appendix A shows that Dν¯∗ and Σ are the mean and variance of the distribution
of effects on the variables of interest, conditional on the shocks delivering the desired
path for the policy instrument (i.e., Rν = r¯ − c). This objective function is chosen
because it provides a metric for considering the plausibility of the experiment from
the perspective of the distribution of shocks that generate the desired path for the
policy instrument. Section 5 provides an example of how S (ν¯T+1) can be used as a
diagnostic on experiments constructed using this method.25
3.4 Comparison with existing approaches
Most of the existing studies documented in Section 2.1 construct their policy experi-
ments using Method 1 with n = K policy news shocks. In this case, the vector of policy
news shocks that implements the experiment, ν∗, is unique. Existing approaches do
not inspect the properties of ν∗ or whether the effects on the rest of the model would
be regarded as a modest policy intervention.26 These studies effectively assume that
the policy experiment is reliable and that agents within the model would regard pol-
icy behavior as consistent with some underlying belief about the systematic conduct
of policy. My approach treats this question as an empirical matter. The extent to which
ν∗ can be considered as consistent with agents’ beliefs about the distribution of νT+1
determines whether the results from the policy experiment are likely to be reliable. In
constrast, very few existing studies characterize a model for agents’ beliefs about the
properties of νT+1.27
24Again, a heuristic approach of starting from many initial conditions is recommended to ensure that
a global minimum is found.
25To gain some intuition, note that, because n ≥ K, it will in general be possible to deliver the desired
path for the policy rate and ensure that the intervention is modest at any significance level. In the limit,
the policy advisor could set M¯ = 0. Inspection of equation (10) reveals that this limiting case would
require that the variables of interest (y) are unchanged from their values in the baseline forecast. This is
likely to generate a somewhat contorted path for the policy instrument, since it is constrained to follow
the desired path for the first K periods and must subsequently move in a way that completely offsets
the effects on the variables of interest. The subsequent movements in the policy rate may be considered
implausible and the objective function for Method 3 is intended to provide a way to measure that.
26Some studies (for example, Carlstrom et al. (2012)) use a piecewise linear, or stacked-time, solution
approaches to compute the effects of (anticipated) temporary deviations from a monetary policy rule.
This means that the shocks ν∗ are not computed directly. But, as noted in Section 2.1, the results com-
puted using those methods are identical to the use of n = K policy news shocks to compute ν∗ using
Method 1.
27Indeed, del Negro et al. (2012) argue that (because ν∗ is unique) the variances of the policy news
shocks are not important. Those studies that do make explicit assumptions about the distribution of the
policy news shocks (for example, Hirose and Kurozumi (2011) and Milani and Treadwell (2012)) do not
examine the type of policy simulations that I study in this paper.
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Method 2 has some similarities to the approach proposed by del Negro et al. (2012):
in both cases the effects of the policy experiment may be regarded as more plausible
than when the experiment is implemented using Method 1; and the path for the policy
instrument that agents expect may not exactly match the desired path. The motivation
for the approach proposed in del Negro et al. (2012) is that the responses of longer-term
interest rates to experiments implemented using Method 1 are too large.28 To generate
more plausible responses, del Negro et al. (2012) use anticipated shocks to the mone-
tary policy rule to deliver a particular change in the long-term interest rate (specified
by the policy advisor conducting the experiment). The influence of the shocks on the
path of the policy rate in the short term is only indirect, through the use of a weighting
function that penalizes the implied changes in the expected policy rate over a ten year
horizon.29
A key difference between the approaches is that my method uses a test for assess-
ing the reliability of the estimated macroeconomic effects based on the beliefs of the
agents that inhabit the estimated model, rather than a penalty function designed by
the policy advisor constructing the experiment. Of course, my method still requires
some judgment on the part of the policy advisor, both in terms of the variables which
are used to construct the modesty statistic, the forecast horizon at which the statistic
is tested and the probability level that constitutes whether or not a particular policy
experiment is deemed to be “modest”.30 Nevertheless, my procedure provides the
policy advisor with a framework in which the sensitivity of her conclusions may be
examined very easily.
4 Empirical exercise
In this section, I use the approach outlined in Section 3 to conduct policy experiments
in a medium-scale DSGE model. Before presenting the policy experiments, I first out-
line the model and the estimation approach.
4.1 The model
I use a variant of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, which has formed the blueprint
for a number of models in active use at central banks.31 The model structure is attrac-
tive to policymakers because it contains similar frictions to those used by Christiano
et al. (2005) to demonstrate that a DSGE model can replicate empirical estimates of
28del Negro et al. (2012) observe that a simulation that temporarily lowers the expected path of the
policy instrument lowers the expected path for the policy instrument for a very prolonged period. They
assess the plausibility of the size of the model’s predictions by comparing them to typical changes in
long-term interest rates observed for dates on which the FOMC made forward guidance announce-
ments.
29del Negro et al. (2012) argue that, conditional on imposing a particular change in the ten-year spot
rate, the macroeconomic effects are relatively unaffected by the path for the short-term interest rate that
delivers that change. The weighting function can therefore be used to influence the path of the policy
rate over the shorter term, while delivering plausible macroeconomic responses.
30As shown in Section 6.1, these choices may have important effects regardless of whether the esti-
mated macroeconomic effects of a particular policy experiment are deemed modest.
31For example, the Riksbank’s RAMSES model (Adolfson et al., 2007); the ECB’s NAWM (Christoffel
et al., 2008); the EDO model of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Edge et al., 2007; Chung et al.,
2010); and the Bank of England’s COMPASS model (Burgess et al., 2013).
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the effects of a monetary policy shock. The model is also attractive because Smets and
Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007) have shown that, when estimated using
Bayesian methods, the model can compete with VARs in its ability to fit (and forecast)
US and euro area data.
The model is very close to the specification of Smets and Wouters (2007). I make
two small modifications to the monetary policy rule. First I include “policy news”
shocks in the specification of the monetary policy rule, as specified in equation (1),
following Milani and Treadwell (2012), Campbell et al. (2012), Hirose and Kurozumi
(2011) and del Negro et al. (2013) among others. As noted in Section 3, these shocks
are the mechanism through which forward guidance experiments are implemented.
The second modification is to exclude the term in the change in the output gap from
the monetary policy rule. In preliminary estimation work, I found that the coefficient
on this term was quite difficult to identify alongside the coefficient on the output gap
itself.32
I also include equations for the expectations theory of the term structure and link
them to data on longer term bond yields, as in De Graeve et al. (2009) and Hirose and
Kurozumi (2011). While this addition does not change the macroeconomic structure
of the model, it does provide additional information with which to identify the policy
news shocks.
Since the Smets and Wouters (2007) model is well known, I focus on the key differ-
ences. The policy rule is:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) [rpipit + ry (yt − y˜t)] + rt (14)
where r denotes the log-deviation of the (gross) nominal interest rate from steady state
and pi is quarterly (consumer price) inflation. The output gap is defined as the log de-
viation of output, y, from the level of output that would prevail if prices and wages
were fully flexible and price and wage markups were constant, denoted y˜. The distur-
bance to the policy rule rt is given by equation (2). I assume that news about future
policy actions can be communicated over a three year horizon (so J = 12 in equation
(2)).
The equations for longer-term nominal interest rates are simple representations of
the expectations theory of the term structure:
rNt =
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
Etrt+i (15)
and I include equations for the one and five year spot nominal interest rates (N =
4, 20). Given my assumption that policy news shocks extend for three years, these
yields are included to provide a balance between providing information to help iden-
tify the shocks containing news about the near future and a more general indication of
the expected path of the policy rate over the longer term.
The measurement equations for the macroeconomic variables are identical to those
used by Smets and Wouters (2007). For the long-term bond yields I use the following
measurement equations to map to the raw data for spot rates (denoted RN ):
100
RNt
4
= rNt + 100
(
p¯iβ¯−1 − 1)+ τN + σme,NωNt (16)
32Hirose and Kurozumi (2011) also exclude the change in the output gap from their policy rule
specification (though they use a production function measure of the output gap rather than a model-
consistent measure of potential output).
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which states that the bond yield is equal to the steady state (short-term) interest rate,
plus a constant term premium (τN ) and a measurement error ωNt ∼ N (0, 1).
4.2 Data and estimation
For the macroeconomic variables, I use an updated version of the dataset constructed
by Smets and Wouters (2007).33 The yield curve data is from the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors website, computed using the methodology of Gurkaynak et al. (2007).
The daily yield curve estimates are converted to quarterly frequency by taking simple
averages. Given the discussion in Section 3, it is important to estimate the model
over a period that can be regarded as a stable monetary policy regime. I estimate
the model over the period 1984Q1–2008Q4 in order to ensure that the sample size is
reasonably large.34 Given that the results in Hirose and Kurozumi (2011) suggest that
the properties of policy news shocks may not have been stable across this period, I
estimate the model over alternative subsamples to investigate robustness in Section
6.2.
I estimate the model using Bayesian likelihood estimation.35 Following Smets and
Wouters (2007), five parameters are held fixed during the estimation process. The
depreciation rate δ is set at 0.025. The steady state ratio of government spending to
GDP (gy) is set at 0.18 and the steady state wage markup (λw) is calibrated to 1.5.
Finally, the curvature of the Kimball aggregators in the goods and labor markets are
set to εp = εw = 10.
The estimation results are shown Tables 1 and 2. The prior moments for the struc-
tural parameters and AR(1) coefficients for the forcing processes are set identically to
Smets and Wouters (2007).36 The priors for the steady state term premia and measure-
ment errors for the long-term yields are intended to be diffuse.
To estimate the posterior parameter distribution, I numerically maximized the pos-
terior density and used a numerical approximation of the Hessian at the mode to pro-
duce simulated draws from the posterior using a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings
algorithm.37 I generated 250,000 simulated draws from four chains of length 87,500
(where the first 25,000 observations in each chain are burned). The acceptance rates
for each chain were between 25% and 28% and MCMC convergence diagnostics indi-
cated that the chains had converged.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the posterior parameter estimates are generally very simi-
lar to those presented by Smets and Wouters (2007, Table 5) for the 1984–2004 subsam-
ple. Some notable exceptions are households’ inverse elasticity of substitution and
habit formation parameters (σc and λ respectively), which I estimate to be somewhat
lower, perhaps reflecting an increase in consumption volatility over the financial cri-
sis. The wage stickiness and labor supply elasticity parameters (ζw and σl) are both
estimated to be somewhat lower than the sub-sample results in Smets and Wouters
33These data were sourced from the Federal Reserve Economic Data database maintained by the St
Louis Fed.
34Data from 1980–1983 is used as a training sample for the Kalman filter.
35See An and Schorfheide (2007) for an excellent review of Bayesian DSGE model estimation.
36The distributions chosen for the parameters are also the same with one exception: I use a Gamma
distribution to ensure that the inflation response parameter in the Taylor rule satisfies the Taylor prin-
ciple.
37The estimation was performed using the MAPS toolkit described in Burgess et al. (2013).
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(2007). Together with the higher variance attributed to the wage markup shock pro-
cess (given that I estimate higher values for ρw and σw), this points to a more flexible
and volatile wage setting block than estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007). The
parameters defining the forcing processes for the shocks are generally quite similar,
though I estimate the process for the risk premium shock to be very persistent (ρb is
close to unity), whereas Smets and Wouters (2007) find little persistence.
For the policy rule parameters, the response of the Fed funds rate to inflation is
estimated to be slightly higher and the responsiveness to the output gap slightly lower
than in Smets and Wouters (2007). The standard deviation of the contemporaneous
monetary policy shock σν,0 is estimated to be slightly smaller, but the overall variance
of all monetary policy shocks (including the policy news components
∑
j σν,j) is larger.
The shock process is also estimated to be more persistent than the results presented in
Smets and Wouters (2007).
There are several interpretations for these differences. It is possible that the addi-
tional data in my sample has provided valuable information for the identification of
the parameters in the model. Alternatively, the difference could reflect a structural
break in the data brought about by the emergence of the financial crisis at the end of
my sample period. In that case, the assumption that I have estimated the model over a
stable policy regime may be cast into doubt, since policy behaviour may have changed
in light of the financial crisis.
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Table 1: Priors and posteriors for estimated parameters
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Dist’n Mean Stda Mean Std 5% 95%
ϕ Capital adjustment cost elasticity Normal 4 1.5 6.514 1.139 4.694 8.448
σc Inverse elasticity of substitution Normal 1.5 0.375 0.9763 0.1621 0.7355 1.267
λ Consumption habits Beta 0.7 0.1 0.5809 0.07134 0.4617 0.6962
ξw Calvo probability for wages Beta 0.5 0.1 0.4324 0.1032 0.284 0.6211
σl Labor supply elasticity Normal 2 0.75 1.436 0.5614 0.584 2.419
ξp Calvo probability for prices Beta 0.5 0.1 0.7252 0.08279 0.6004 0.8531
ιw Wage indexation parameter Beta 0.5 0.15 0.4517 0.1457 0.2196 0.701
ιp Inflation indexation parameter Beta 0.5 0.15 0.1517 0.06201 0.06387 0.2651
ψ Elasticity of capital utilization Beta 0.5 0.15 0.6619 0.1115 0.4675 0.8337
Φ Production fixed cost Normal 1.25 0.125 1.528 0.08673 1.388 1.673
rpi − 1 Policy rule feedback on inflation Gamma 0.5 0.25 1.187 0.3525 0.6704 1.814
ρR Policy rule response to lagged rate Beta 0.75 0.1 0.8434 0.0396 0.7727 0.8996
ry Policy rule response to output gap Normal 0.125 0.05 0.01518 0.02904 -0.02132 0.07113
pi Inflation target Gamma 0.625 0.1 0.6379 0.09544 0.4894 0.802
100 (β−1 − 1) Discount rate Gamma 0.25 0.1 0.2296 0.08718 0.1062 0.3901
L¯ Hours measurement equation constant Normal 0 2 -0.5214 1.856 -3.579 2.547
γ¯ Quarterly steady state growth rate Normal 0.4 0.1 0.4568 0.02559 0.4133 0.4958
ρga Government and productivity shock correlation Normal 0.5 0.25 0.3962 0.09867 0.2347 0.5589
α Capital share in production Normal 0.3 0.05 0.1717 0.02293 0.1341 0.2096
ρa Persistence of producivity process Beta 0.5 0.2 0.916 0.02493 0.8732 0.9549
ρb Persistence of risk premium process Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9842 0.009121 0.9675 0.996
ρg Persistence of government spending process Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9756 0.01163 0.9542 0.9917
ρI Persistence of investment cost process Beta 0.5 0.2 0.636 0.1086 0.4574 0.8176
ρr Persistence of monetary policy process Beta 0.5 0.2 0.6232 0.05214 0.5336 0.7042
ρp Persistence of price markup process Beta 0.5 0.2 0.927 0.06305 0.8115 0.9922
ρw Persistence of wage markup process Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9898 0.004745 0.9812 0.9965
aDegrees of freedom for inverse gamma distributions.
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Table 2: Priors and posteriors for estimated parameters (continued)
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Dist’n Mean Stda Mean Std 5% 95%
µp Price markup moving average parameter Beta 0.5 0.2 0.6838 0.1047 0.4893 0.8325
µw Wage markup moving average parameter Beta 0.5 0.2 0.6258 0.1804 0.3183 0.8934
σa Std dev of productivity shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.3804 0.03018 0.3336 0.4323
σb Std dev of risk premium shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.02464 0.006533 0.01529 0.03657
σg Std dev of govt spending shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.3866 0.02871 0.343 0.4367
σI Std dev of investment price shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.3396 0.06564 0.2409 0.4551
σp Std dev of price markup shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.09304 0.01197 0.07388 0.1133
σw Std dev of wage markup shock Invgamma 0.1 2 0.4039 0.06514 0.3163 0.528
100× σν,0 Std dev of monetary policy shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 9.723 1.066 8.142 11.6
100× σν,1 Std dev of 1 quarter ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 2.7 1.324 0.7446 4.926
100× σν,2 Std dev of 2 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 5.024 1.402 2.219 6.982
100× σν,3 Std dev of 3 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 3.562 1.565 0.8822 5.905
100× σν,4 Std dev of 4 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.432 0.767 0.5317 2.965
100× σν,5 Std dev of 5 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.309 0.6326 0.5181 2.514
100× σν,6 Std dev of 6 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.392 0.683 0.5393 2.706
100× σν,7 Std dev of 7 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.507 0.7798 0.5564 3.045
100× σν,8 Std dev of 8 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.316 0.6542 0.5114 2.6
100× σν,9 Std dev of 9 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.326 0.6631 0.5197 2.619
100× σν,10 Std dev of 10 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.346 0.6509 0.5301 2.616
100× σν,11 Std dev of 11 quarters ahead policy news shock Invgamma 2.752 2.001 1.778 0.8739 0.61 3.374
σme,4 Std dev of measurement error, 1 year spot rate Invgamma 0.2 2 0.02317 0.004896 0.01588 0.03192
σme,20 Std dev of measurement error, 5 year spot rate Invgamma 0.2 2 0.02918 0.006633 0.01933 0.04093
τ4 Steady state term premium on 1 year bond Normal 0 1 0.04965 0.01482 0.02479 0.07335
τ20 Steady state term premium on 5 year bond Normal 0 1 0.2872 0.05999 0.185 0.3827
aDegrees of freedom for inverse gamma distributions.
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4.3 Model-based forecast distributions
In this section I briefly summarize the model’s forecasts for key variables over the
forecast horizon 2009Q1–2013Q2 and compare them to the actual realizations of the
data over that period.
Figure 1: Model forecasts and actual outturns for key variables
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Notes: The panels show confidence sets of forecasts generated by the DSGE model, obtained by drawing
from the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters. The past data are shown by the solid black
lines and the actual realizations over the forecast horizon are shown by the dashed red lines.
Figure 1 shows that the model’s forecasts of inflation and GDP growth were broadly
in line with the subsequent realizations of the data over the first year or so of the fore-
cast horizon. Thereafter, the forecast densities diverge from the realized data some-
what, with the model tending to under-predict inflation and over-predict GDP growth.
Perhaps most striking is the divergence between the forecast density for the Fed funds
rate, which has significantly more mass above the realized path than below it for the
entire forecast horizon.
However, the forecast densities in Figure 1 do not impose the zero bound on the
Fed funds rate. As shown by Coenen and Warne (2013), imposing the zero bound on
such simulations will increase deflation risks considerably, because the policy rate can-
not be reduced in response to deflationary shocks. Given that even the unconstrained
densities in Figure 1 exhibit a sizable deflation risk, policymakers faced with these
forecasts would likely be concerned about the limited ability to respond by further
reducing the Fed funds rate. Indeed, the minutes of the FOMC meeting on 15–16 De-
cember 2008 reveal that some Committee members “expressed concern that inflation
might decline below levels consistent with price stability in the medium term”.38
38See Federal Open Market Committee (2008, p8).
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Such concerns motivate the consideration of policies that might mitigate the risk
of deflation. One such experiment is to consider holding the Fed funds rate at a lower
level than expected by agents in the baseline forecast. At their meeting on 15–16 De-
cember 2008, the FOMC discussed the effects of forward guidance over the path for
the Fed funds rate: “participants judged that communicating the Committee’s expec-
tation that short-term interest rates were likely to stay exceptionally low for some time
could be useful because it would lead to pricing of longer term interest rates consistent
with the path of monetary policy that policymakers saw as most likely”.39
4.4 Forward guidance experiments
In this section, I consider the task of a policy advisor who is asked to estimate the
macroeconomic effects of alternative paths for the Fed funds rate. The policy advisor
uses the model described in Section 4.1 to estimate the consequences of holding the
policy rate temporarily lower than the baseline forecast produced by the model. These
experiments are similar to those analyzed by del Negro et al. (2012).
Of course, in the midst of the financial crisis, it may have been entirely sensible
for agents to have expected the central bank to take extraordinary actions in response
to extraordinary events. However, a policy advisor with a single-regime rational ex-
pectations model cannot reliably estimate the effects of such extraordinary policies.
As explained in Section 2.2, the best that she can do is estimate the effects of policies
that are consistent with agents’ beliefs about the conduct of policy in the recent past.
This is what I estimate in the following experiments. Within the limitations of my
approach, I apply a relatively loose constraint when testing whether an experiment
constitutes a modest policy intervention. Specifically, I use the 5% critical values of
the relevant χ2 distributions, which means that I allow experiments that agents would
consider relatively unlikely ex ante to be classed as modest policy interventions. This
captures at least the spirit of the idea that quite radical policy experiments may have
been contemplated at this stage of the financial crisis.
A key choice for the policy advisor is the specification of the modesty statistic used
to assess the effects of the policy experiment. The advisor must choose the set of vari-
ables for which the effects of the experiment will be tested and the horizon at which
the responses of those variables are tested. In the context of the analysis in Section
3, this corresponds to the choice of the matrix Q in the mapping yt = Qxt and the
horizon, h, at which the effects [y¯T+h − ETyT+h] are tested. Given that a key part of
the forward guidance puzzle is the fact that the effect on macroeconomic variables is
so front-loaded, I focus on the impact effects of the policy announcement by setting
the horizon equal to h = 1.40 I include the responses of inflation and GDP growth in
the set of variables for which modesty is tested, given the focus on inflation and eco-
nomic activity in del Negro et al. (2012) and Yellen (2012). I assess the robustness of
the analysis to these choices in Section 6.1.
Figure 2 shows the forecasts for GDP growth, inflation and the Fed funds rate un-
der different assumptions about policy. In all charts, the black solid lines depict the
baseline forecast from the estimated DSGE model.41 The gray lines show the realized
39Federal Open Market Committee (2008, p8).
40This means that I test whether the responses are plausible in period T + 1, using the modesty
statistic (10) with h = 1.
41The ‘baseline projection’ is generated using the posterior mean of the parameter vector.
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Figure 2: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for one year
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Notes: The left and right hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions. In both
columns, the baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the solid
gray line. The left column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for the Fed funds
rate for K = 4 periods is generated using n = K = 4 policy news shocks (‘just identified’, red dashed
lines) and n = J = 12 policy news shocks (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines), both implemented using
Method 1. The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with these simulations are reported in the
legend. The right column repeats the experiments, but in each case imposes the additional restriction
that the policy intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance level. Method 2 is used
for n = K = 4 (‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and Method 3 for n = J = 12 (‘all shocks’, blue dotted
lines).
outcomes over the forecast horizon. The remaining lines plot the forecasts correspond-
ing to policy experiments in which the Fed funds rate is held fixed at 12.5bps for four
quarters.42 The left and right columns of charts impose this path for policy using the
methods introduced in Section 3.
In the left column, the red dashed lines are generated under the assumption that
n = 4 policy news shocks are used to hold the Fed funds rate at 12.5bps for K =
4 quarters: this corresponds to a version of Method 1 that is ‘just-identified’ (since
n = K). This implementation generates a sizable increase in both GDP growth and
inflation: signs of the “forward guidance puzzle”. The p-value of the modesty statistic
for this simulation is less than 0.01%, suggesting that agents would not regard this
policy experiment as a modest intervention. The dotted blue lines in the left column
show the case in which the policy experiment is implemented using n = J = 12 policy
news shocks. This represents the case in which the intention to hold the Fed funds rate
at 12.5bps for one year is signaled using the full set of policy news shocks that appear
in equation (1). The macroeconomic effects of this simulation are considerably smaller
42I choose 12.5bps as this is the midpoint of the targeted range for the funds rate since 2009Q1 (and
corresponds roughly to the level of the realized funds rate depicted in the gray line).
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than for the ‘just identified’ case depicted in the red dashed lines.43
From a very mechanical perspective, this result follows from the fact that the proce-
dure uses a larger number of monetary policy news shocks. The ability to control the
path for the Fed funds rate beyond the four quarters for which the rate follows the de-
sired path makes it possible to support an equilibrium in which inflation and the out-
put gap respond by less and so the size of the policy news shocks required to hold the
Fed funds rate on its desired path are smaller. This equilibrium is achieved by select-
ing policy news shocks that produce a trajectory for the Feds fund rate that lies above
the baseline path further out in the forecast horizon.44 Despite the markedly smaller
macroeconomic responses, this intervention would still not be considered modest us-
ing a significance level of 5%.
The right hand column of Figure 2 show the cases in which the policy experiments
are constrained to ensure that the intervention is considered to be modest by agents
in the model. A critical value of 5% for the modesty statistic is used to make this as-
sessment. Once again, the dashed red lines are ‘just identified’ and are implemented
using n = K = 4 shocks (using Method 2). As expected, in this case the macroeco-
nomic effects are smaller than the case in which the intervention is not constrained to
be modest (left hand column). But this is achieved by implementing a path for the
Fed funds rate that misses its target level over the first four quarters of the forecast
horizon: in particular, the funds rate tightens noticeably in the fourth quarter.
The dotted blue lines in the right hand column of Figure 2 are implemented using
the full set of policy news shocks (n = J = 12), but using Method 3 so that the inter-
vention is constrained to be modest at the 5% significance level. The responses in this
case are very similar to those in the left panel (since in that case, the p-value of the
intervention was almost 4%).
An important result from Figure 2 is that the size of the responses of the individual
variables are not sufficient for assessing whether the experiment is regarded as mod-
est. For example, the macroeconomic effects of the ‘modesty constrained’ experiment
using n = K = 4 policy news shocks using Method 2 (right column, dashed red lines)
are larger than those for the case in which Method 1 is used with n = J = 12 shocks
(left column, dotted blue lines), even though the former experiment is considered more
likely to be a modest policy intervention than the latter. This result underscores the
fact that the modesty statistic is a multivariate statistic and is determined by the co-
movement of the variables considered as well as by the absolute size and sign of the
effects on each variable.
Figure 3 presents a policy experiment in which the Fed funds rate is held at 12.5bp
for two years (K = 8). The broad pattern of results in this case is similar to that
described for the one-year experiment. In the left hand column, the ‘just identified’
(n = K = 8) implementation depicted in the red dashed lines generates a substantial
rise in inflation and an enormous instantaneous boom in GDP growth. From the per-
spective of the modesty statistic, this is a zero probability event. When implemented
43As noted in Section 3.3, from the perspective of the model, using the entire set of policy news
shocks (n = J = 12, generating the blue dotted lines) is the most natural way to implement the exper-
iment, since beliefs over the behavior of monetary policy are affected by all of these shocks. The main
motivation for examining the ‘just identified’ experiment (n = K = 4, red dashed lines) is that this is
the way the experiment has typically been implemented in recent papers.
44This is barely noticeable in Figure 2, but has an important effect on the results. Figure 6 in Section
5 provides more detailed illustrations of this effect for a policy experiment in which the Fed funds rate
is held lower for eight quarters.
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Figure 3: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for two years
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Notes: The left and right hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions. In both
columns, the baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the solid
gray line. The left column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for the Fed funds
rate for K = 8 periods is generated using n = K = 8 policy news shocks (‘just identified’, red dashed
lines) and n = J = 12 policy news shocks (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines), both implemented using
Method 1. The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with these simulations are reported in the
legend. The right column repeats the experiments, but in each case imposes the additional restriction
that the policy intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance level. Method 2 is used
for n = K = 8 (‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and Method 3 for n = J = 12 (‘all shocks’, blue dotted
lines).
using the full set of available policy news shocks (n = J = 12), the macroeconomic
effects are substantially smaller, though even so the intervention is not modest at the
5% significance level.
The right column of Figure 3 shows the case in which the policy intervention is
constrained to be modest at the 5% significance level. When the experiment is im-
plemented using n = K = 8 shocks (red dashed lines), the effects are substantially
dampened, but once more this is achieved by missing the desired path for the Fed
funds rate and raising the rate somewhat earlier than prescribed by the desired path.
Two interesting results emerge from Figure 3. First, when the experiment is imple-
mented using n = J = 12 policy news shocks (dotted blue lines), the effect on inflation
is larger than the responses plotted in the left hand column. Once again, the multivari-
ate modesty statistic is influenced by the relative co-movement of the macroeconomic
variables. Second, the right column of Figure 3 shows that the paths of GDP growth
and inflation are almost identical for the cases in which the Fed funds rate path is im-
posed using n = K and n = J shocks, despite the fact that the paths for the Fed funds
rate are quite different. The path for the Fed funds rate tightens earlier (but by less)
for the n = K implementation. Again, this emphasizes that it is the entire path for the
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policy rate that matters for determining the macroeconomic effects. Both results are
explored further in Section 5.
Figure 4: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for three years
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Notes: The left and right hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions. In both
columns, the baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the
solid gray line. The left column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for the Fed
funds rate for K = 12 periods is generated using n = K = 12 policy news shocks (‘just identified’, red
dashed lines), using Method 1. The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with this simulation is
reported in the legend. The right column repeats the experiments, but imposes the additional restriction
that the policy intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05. Since n = K, Method 2 is used.
Figure 4 shows the case in which the Fed funds rate is held at 12.5bp for three years.
Because the Fed funds rate is to be fixed for three years, this experiment requires the
use of all 12 available policy news shocks. Implementing the experiment using Method
1 with n = J = K = 12 (left column) generates results that are truly incredible: and
indeed the p-value of the modesty statistic is zero.45
The right column of Figure 4 shows the results when the experiment is constrained
to be modest at the 5% significance level. By construction, the Fed funds rate does
not follow the desired path exactly. In the twelfth quarter of the forecast horizon, the
Fed funds rate rises sharply such that the trajectory of the policy rate lies above the
baseline forecast from the fourteenth quarter onwards. This path for the funds rate
generates outcomes for growth and inflation that would presumably be regarded as
far more plausible by most policymakers and their advisors.
The final experiment in this section considers the case in which the Fed funds rate
is reduced by a small amount for a short time. Specifically, I simulate the case in which
the Fed funds rate is held 25bp lower than the baseline projection for one year. The
45The responses in Figure 4 are of a similar order of magnitude as those presented in Carlstrom et al.
(2012).
26
objective is to demonstrate how Methods 2 and 3 can be applied to the case in which
Method 1 generates a modest intervention. This allows the policy advisor to produce
a simulation in which the effects of the intervention are as unlikely as possible, subject
to the constraint that agents still believe that the intervention is modest at a particular
significance level.
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 5. The left column shows the
results when the path for the Fed funds rate is implemented using Method 1. The two
variants presented are ‘just identified’ (n = K = 4, red dashed lines) and using all
policy news shocks (n = J = 12, blue dotted lines). Each variant generates virtually
identical trajectories for the variables of interest. In both cases, the intervention would
be judged modest by agents in the model, since the p-values of the modesty statistics
exceed 0.7. The right-hand column shows the case in which the path for the Fed funds
rate is implemented using Methods 2 and 3.46
Figure 5: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is cut by 25bp for one year
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Notes: The left and right hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions. In both
columns, the baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the solid
gray line. The left column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for the Fed funds
rate for K = 4 periods is generated using n = K = 4 policy news shocks (‘just identified’, red dashed
lines) and n = J = 12 policy news shocks (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines), both implemented using
Method 1. The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with these simulations are reported in the
legend. The right column repeats the experiments, but in each case imposes the additional restriction
that the policy intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance level. Method 2 is used
for n = K = 4 (‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and Method 3 for n = J = 12 (‘all shocks’, blue dotted
lines).
46Method 2 is used for the just-identified case (n = K = 4) and Method 3 when n = J = 12.
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5 Inspecting the mechanism
In this section, I explore some of the policy experiments in more detail, to uncover
the underlying mechanisms at work. I start with the results in the left-hand column
of Figure 3, which shows results for the experiment in which the Fed funds rate is
held low for two years. The left-hand column shows that, when the experiment is
implemented using n = J = 12 policy news shocks, the effects on inflation and GDP
are much smaller than when the experiment is implemented using n = K = 8 shocks.
However, the paths for the Fed funds rate over the five year forecast horizon are very
similar.
Figure 6: Diagnostics for experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for two years
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Notes: Each panel shows the responses of a particular variable to the policy experiment conducted in
the left hand column of Figure 3. The responses are measured relative to the baseline forecast, so that
each line represents the marginal effect of the policy experiment on that variable. The policy experiment
implemented using n = K = 8 shocks is shown by the dashed red line. The experiment using n = J =
12 shocks is shown by the blue dotted line.
To explain this result, Figure 6 plots the marginal responses of key variables, mea-
sured as the difference between the projection for the variable when the Fed funds rate
is held lower and the baseline projection. These responses are plotted over a ten-year
horizon, to help illustrate the mechanisms at work.
The dashed red lines in Figure 6 show the responses when the Fed funds rate is
held low for two years using n = K = 8 policy news shocks, so that the experiment
is ‘just identified’. The dotted blue lines show the effects when n = J = 12 shocks are
used. In the ‘just identified’ case, lowering the Fed funds rate boosts inflation by 4pp
and the peak effect on the level of output is around 6%. In contrast, when all policy
news shocks are used, the peak effect on GDP is around 1% and the initial increase in
inflation is small (indeed inflation is weaker after about a year). In the two experiments
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the Fed funds rate paths are (by construction) identical for the first two years and are
very similar during the third year of the forecast horizon. Later on, however, the paths
diverge.
Indeed, the ‘just identified’ variant of the policy experiment exhibits the property
that the path for the Fed funds rate lies below the baseline path for a prolonged pe-
riod (it is still around 0.1 pp below the baseline path after 10 years). del Negro et al.
(2012) emphasize the persistence of the effects of a similar experiment that temporarily
lowers the expected path of the policy instrument. In their model, the expected path
for the policy instrument also remains lower for a prolonged period. In both their ex-
periment and mine, persistently lower nominal interest rates are determined by the
monetary policy reaction function, which responds to a prolonged period in which
inflation and/or the output gap are (slightly) lower than forecast in the baseline case.
In the ‘just identified’ variant of my simulation (dashed red lines), inflation falls below
the baseline projection from around 2013 and GDP falls below the baseline projection
from the end of 2017.
A persistently lower nominal interest rate combined with a large initial rise in in-
flation creates a significant initial fall in the long-term real interest rate, which stim-
ulates demand and validates the initial rise in inflation. The bottom row of Figure 6
shows that the short-term annualized real interest rate (defined as rrt ≡ rt − Etpit+1)
falls by almost 5 percentage points and a measure of the longer term rate (defined as
rrLt ≡
∑∞
j=0 rrt+j) falls by nearly 40 percentage points. Because forward-looking con-
sumption and investment behavior are driven by these longer-term real interest rates,
this represents an enormous stimulus to the economy.
The path for the policy shock forcing process (rt ) that delivers these striking results
is plotted as the dashed red line in the bottom right panel. The path of the forcing
process implies a loosening of around 200bp initially, even though the Fed funds rate
only falls by around 100bp. The disturbance to the policy rule must be larger than the
fall in the Fed funds rate because inflation and GDP rise so much in response to the
policy experiment. After its initial decline, the path for rt returns relatively smoothly
back to zero, in line with (2).
When all of the policy news shocks are used, the path for the forcing process is
rather different. As shown in the dotted blue lines, the forcing process initially falls
by less and then becomes positive in the third year of the forecast horizon. The path
is generated by positive policy news shocks during the third year. The net result is
a path for the Fed funds rate that is temporarily higher than the baseline path in the
third and fourth year of the forecast horizon. The anticipated future tightening of
policy mitigates the effects of the policy experiment on longer term nominal interest
rates. This variant of the experiment is therefore consistent with a smaller decline in
the long-term real interest rate and a correspondingly smaller increase in GDP and
inflation. The expected future tightening of policy (relative to the baseline forecast)
leads to a small decline in GDP in the third year of the projection. Because inflation is
very forward looking, inflation falls below the baseline forecast even earlier than this.
The more muted responses of output and inflation are thus consistent with the smaller
initial response of rt .
Figure 7 presents a similar analysis of the results in Figure 3 when n = J = 12
policy shocks are used. The objective in this case is to study how the constraint on the
modesty of outcomes affects the results.47 The results in Figure 7 show that, to satisfy
47The solid green lines in Figure 3 correspond to the dotted blue lines in the right hand column of
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Figure 7: Diagnostics for experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for two years
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Notes: Each panel shows the responses of a particular variable to the policy experiment conducted in
Figure 3. The responses are measured relative to the baseline forecast, so that each line represents the
marginal effect of the policy experiment on that variable. The policy experiment implemented using
n = J = 12 shocks is shown by the blue dotted line. The experiment using n = J = 12 shocks that is
also constrained to be modest at the 5% significance level is shown by the solid green line.
the restriction that the intervention is modest, the policy experiment must generate an
impact effect on GDP is slightly larger and an impact effect on inflation is considerably
larger (around twice the size of the case in which no modesty constraint is imposed).
The joint behavior of the variables plotted in Figure 7 are, of course, the result of the
general equilibrium effect of the policy shocks used to implement the experiment. The
larger initial effect on inflation is generated by a larger near-term increase in GDP and
a smaller subsequent undershoot of the baseline projection in 2011-12. This requires
a long-term real rate that returns more quickly to the baseline forecast. To deliver
this time profile for the long-term real interest rate, the Fed funds rate must rise more
sharply above the baseline path after the initial K = 8 periods for which it is held low.
That is because, in the solid green lines, the behavior of real interest rates after the first
year or so of the simulation are driven by the behavior of the nominal rate path rather
than by expected inflation.48 Generating this path for the Fed funds rate requires a
volatile profile for the policy shock forcing process (bottom right panel).49
Figure 3. The dotted blue lines in Figure 3 correspond to the dotted blue lines in the left hand column
of Figure 3 (ie without a constraint on the modesty of the policy experiment).
48The converse is true in the blue dotted lines.
49These results demonstrate again that the entire path for the policy instrument is important in de-
termining the macroeconomic effects of the policy intervention. In particular, the effects depend on
how the policy instrument behaves after the period for which it is constrained to follow the desired
path. This result echoes the findings of Blake (2013) who finds that experiments in which the policy rate
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Figure 8: Joint distributions of effects of policy interventions on GDP and inflation
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Notes: The solid gray lines are contours of the ex ante joint distribution of the effects on GDP and infla-
tion at date T + 1 generated by policy announcements νT+1. The labels denote the mass of probability
outside each contour line. These contours therefore encompass the set of effects that would be regarded
as modest at the labeled significance level. The gray shaded area denotes the area encompassed by 99%
of the joint distribution of effects on GDP and inflation of interventions that deliver a lower path for the
Fed funds rate for two years (RνT+1 = r¯−c). The red asterisk is the mean of the distribution. The green
square denotes the effects on GDP and inflation when the path for the Fed funds rate is constrained to
satisfy the restriction RνT+1 = r¯ − c and the policy intervention is constrained to be modest at the 5%
significance level, using Method 3. Appendix A provides details of how these densities are computed.
To see why imposing the modesty constraint generates a larger initial response of
inflation, Figure 8 presents a two dimensional representation of the χ2 distribution
used to evaluate the modesty test statistic. The x-axis measures the effect of the policy
intervention on the level of GDP in the first quarter of the simulation, measured as a
percentage deviation from the baseline forecast. The y-axis measures the percentage
point effect on quarterly inflation in the first quarter of the simulation, again mea-
sured relative to the baseline forecast. Each axis therefore corresponds to one row of
[y¯T+h − ETyT+h] in equation (8). The solid lines correspond to the contours of the χ2
distribution for MhT . The labels refer to the probability of observations lying outside
the region defined by the contour.
Recall that the distribution used to evaluate the modesty of the policy intervention
is the distribution of outcomes for inflation and GDP that agents expect to be generated
by policy interventions νT+1. The solid contour lines are centered on zero, indicating
that the most likely (and expected) effect on GDP and inflation is zero, as would be
generated by the most likely (and expected) intervention νT+1 = 0. The contours are
also symmetric around zero because, prior to a policy intervention, agents believe that
tightens immediately after a prolonged (anticipated) loosening may have very small effects on growth
and inflation.
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it is equally likely that the intervention could tighten or loosen policy. The upward
slope in the contours indicates that, in general, a policy intervention that generates an
increase in GDP will also generate an increase in inflation.
The red asterisk shows the marginal effect of the policy intervention that holds the
Fed funds rate at 12.5bp for K = 8 quarters when it is implemented using n = J = 12
policy news shocks.50 The asterisk lies outside the 5% contour of the distribution of
MhT and is therefore not regarded as modest at this significance level.
The gray disk that is centered on the red asterisk is based on the distribution of
outcomes for GDP and inflation, conditional on the policy intervention delivering the
desired path for the Fed funds rate (equal to 12.5bp for 8 quarters). Specifically, 99%
of outcomes lie within the disk. This distribution is used for the test statistic S (ν¯T+1)
in equation (13). Again, there is an upward slope in this distribution indicating hold-
ing the Fed funds rate at 25bp for two years in a way that generates a larger (smaller)
effect on GDP would also tend to generate a larger (smaller) effect on inflation. Com-
pared with the distribution of MhT , the gray disk has relatively more mass in the region
in which both GDP and inflation increase, reflecting the fact that the distribution is
conditional on the intervention generating a prolonged fall in the Fed funds rate.
Applying Method 3 to impose that the policy intervention is modest at the 5%
significance level involves finding a point on the 5% contour of the distribution for
MhT that is most likely from the perspective of the distribution represented by the gray
disk. That point is the green square in Figure 8. The green square lies to the North
East of the red asterisk, so the initial effects on GDP and inflation are larger when the
policy experiment is constrained to be a modest policy intervention.
The fact that the green square lies outside the gray disk – which encompasses 99%
of the outcomes conditional on the policy intervention delivering the desired path for
the Fed funds rate – indicates that it is not a very likely outcome from the perspective
of this distribution.
The test statistic S (ν¯T+1) can therefore be used to assess the plausibility of policy
experiments from the perspective of the distribution of outcomes conditional on the
policy rate following the desired path. Figure 9 shows three alternative policy experi-
ments. In each case, the Fed funds rate is held low for two years, but the experiments
differ in terms of the extent to which they are constrained to be modest. Forcing the
experiment to be more modest (increasing the p-value of constraint on MhT from 0.05
to 0.25 to 0.5) reduces the initial effect on growth and inflation. In terms of Figure 8
this represents a movement towards the origin, so that the policy intervention is more
likely from the perspective of the distribution of MhT . However, from the perspective
of test statistic S in equation (13), the outcomes are increasingly unlikely. The values
of S are reported in Figure 9 and represent zero probability events for the relevant χ2
distributions.
Figure 9 shows that, to deliver interventions that are increasingly modest requires
increasingly large overshoots of the path for the Fed funds rate for the period after
the policy rate is constrained to follow the desired path. Larger overshoots mitigate
the stimulus provided by the reduction in the Fed funds rate over the first two years
of the projection (so that long-term real interest rates fall by less). But the subsequent
movements in long term real interest rates generate arguably implausible secondary
cycles in growth and inflation.
These observations suggest that a policy advisor may find it useful to inspect the
50The experiment is shown in the left column of Figure 3 in the blue dotted lines.
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Figure 9: Policy experiments imposing alternative modesty constraints
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Notes: The figures show baseline forecasts (solid black lines) together with three policy simulations. In
each case, the Fed funds rate is held low (at 12.5bp) for K = 8 quarters and is implemented using using
n = J = 12 policy news shocks using Method 3. Each experiment is constrained to be a modest policy
intervention at a different significance level (indicated by the legend specifying the value of p). Also
reported is the value of S (ν), the minimand of the problem solved by Method 3. In the absence of the
modesty constraint, S (ν) ∼ χ2 (2).
distribution of outcomes that agents would expect to be generated by policy interven-
tions (rather than the arrival of other shocks). The analysis of Section 3.3 shows that
the distribution of the variables of interest in period T + h generated by policy inter-
ventions in period T + 1 is a multivariate normal densities with mean QBhxT |T and
covariance ΩT+h.51 Once again, I abstract from the zero bound on the Fed funds rate.
Figure 10 presents these distributions for the variables of interest and the Fed funds
rate. The dashed line in the bottom left panel indicates the 12.5bp level of the Fed
funds rate that has been used in the policy simulations. Beyond the first quarter of the
forecast horizon, the dashed line lies outside the 5%–95% confidence set for the path of
the Fed funds rate. So the probability of observing a policy intervention that holds the
Fed funds rate at this level for a prolonged period is very low and this may prompt
the policy advisor to suspect that such an intervention is unlikely to be regarded as
modest by agents in the model.
51The solid contour lines in Figure 8 uses this result to plot the joint distribution of the effects on
GDP and inflation in the period that the policy intervention is announced.
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Figure 10: Distribution of outcomes generated by policy interventions
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Notes: Each panel shows the baseline forecast (solid black line) together with confidence sets for the
outcomes generated by policy interventions νT+1. Appendix A provides details of how these densities
are computed.
6 Robustness analysis
In this section, I explore the sensitivity of the results in two important dimensions.
First, I examine whether the results are robust to the definition of the modesty statis-
tic. The second question is whether the estimated model used in Section 4.4 contains a
reliable characterization of agent’s beliefs about monetary policy behavior. I examine
these questions by estimating the model over different samples, according to alterna-
tive (narrative) definitions of what might constitute a stable monetary regime and by
estimating the model using different specifications for the monetary policy reaction
function.
6.1 Specification of the modesty statistic
As noted in Section 4.4, the extent to which a policy experiment is viewed as modest
by agents in the model is determined by the specification of the modesty statistic that
will be tested. Specifically, the researcher must make two choices: which variables are
to be included in the assessment of whether the change in the forecast is modest; and
the horizon, h, at which that assessment is made. In Section 4.4, I focused on the effect
in the period of announcement, T + 1, (i.e., I set h = 1) on inflation and GDP growth,
given the key importance of these variables for policy analysis and the observation
that the responses to forward guidance simulations are likely to be regarded by many
economists as excessively front-loaded.
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Figure 11: Modesty test statistics for alternative combinations of variables
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Notes: Each panel shows a scatter plot of the p-values associated with modesty tests at different hori-
zons. The x-axis measures the p-value of the test statistic at horizon h = 1 and the y-axis measures the
p-value of the test statistic for horizon h = 4. Each marker type shows the results when a particular sub-
set of observable variables are chosen for the test: red triangles = 1 variable; blue circles = 2 variables;
green asterixes = 3 variables; black crosses = 4 variables; cyan squares = 5 variables; magenta diamonds
= 6 variables. The panels contain results for the implementation of experiments in Figures 2, 3 and 4
using Method 1 with n = K (i.e., just-identified).
In this section, I re-examine the extent to which the policy experiments conducted
in Section 4.4 would be viewed as modest under alternative specifications of the test
statistic. I consider the use of different combinations of variables at different horizons.
I consider all possible combinations of the macroeconomic variables in the set of ob-
servable variables used to estimate the model. The set of macroeconomic variables is:
GDP growth; consumption growth; investment growth; quarterly inflation; total hours
worked; and quarterly nominal wage growth.52 This set of six variables generates 63
distinct combinations of variables that can be used to specify the modesty statistic.53
To examine the sensitivity of the results to the forecast horizon at which the modesty
statistic is computed, I compare the results under my baseline assumption of h = 1
with the results for h = 4, which correspond to the four-quarter-ahead projections.
The results are presented in the form of scatter plots in Figure 11. Each panel shows
the results based on the cases in which the Fed funds rate is held fixed for K = 4, 8, 12
quarters respectively. The calculations are based on the cases in which the policy ex-
periment is just identified (that is, using Method 1, with n = K).54 So the results are
based on the forecasts that generate the red dashed lines in the left-hand columns of
Figures 2, 3 and 4.
Figure 11 shows that, for h = 1, none of the three policy experiments (correspond-
ing to K = 4, 8, 12) would be considered modest for the commonly used critical signif-
icance level of 5% (or even the 1% significance level), regardless of the specification of
the modesty statistic.
However, the distribution of the points shows that a there are a number of defini-
52This means that I exclude the Fed funds rate and the long-term interest rate measures, following
Adolfson et al. (2005) who exclude the policy instrument from the set of variables used to define the
modesty statistics that they test.
53The number of combinations of j variables from a set ofN variables is given by Cj ≡ N !N !(N−j)! . The
total number of combinations is therefore given by
∑N
j=1 Cj , which gives 63 combinations for N = 6.
54A technicality that arises here is that for the case of K = 4 quarters, I cannot compute modesty
statistics for more than 4 observable variables because the rank of the covariance matrix used to com-
pute Mh is equal to K. In this case, I simply plot the results from modesty statistics based on all
combinations of 4, 3, 2 and 1 variables.
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tions of the modesty statistic with h = 4 that would imply that the policy experiment
is modest using conventional significance levels. This is particularly true for the left-
most panel (in which K = 4), but there is also one instance in which the results shown
in Figure 3 would also be classified as modest, despite the fact that the macroeconomic
responses in this case would likely be considered incredible by most economists and
policymakers.
There is a straightforward explanation for these findings. The dynamics of the
model are very front loaded, so that inflation and output growth (and the other vari-
ables in the model) move a lot on the announcement of the policy experiment (h = 1)
before converging back towards their baseline paths. Inspection of Figures 2, 3 and
4 reveals that GDP growth and inflation are relatively close to their baseline paths
after 4 quarters, so the change in the projection at this horizon is more likely to be
interpreted as modest. This logic is also consistent with the observation that modesty
statistics based on a single variable (red triangles) are more likely to indicate that the
experiment represents a modest policy intervention when the horizon is h = 4. That
is because these specifications of the test statistic are defined using only the (squared)
size of the change in a single variable and the co-movement of that variable with other
variables is ignored.
As a final illustration of the importance of the specification of the modesty statis-
tic, I consider variants that focus attention on the responses of expected future interest
rates in the spirit of del Negro et al. (2012). Figure 12 plots the p-values associated
with the modesty test statistics defined using forward interest rates at different hori-
zons. Each p-value is computed by setting the Q matrix in equation (6) to select the
expectation of the policy rate in a particular future period. Each panel is based on
the case in which the shocks used to implement the path for the policy rate are just
identified (so n = K and Method 1 is used) for the one-year, two-year and three-year
experiments depicted in Figures 2 , 3 and 4.55
Figure 12 shows that neither the one-year (K = 4) nor two-year (K = 8) experi-
ments would cause concern for a policy advisor using conventional significance lev-
els. Even the three-year experiment (K = 12) generates effects on forward interest
rates between four and five years ahead (16–20 quarters) that would be judged statis-
tically likely by the modesty statistic.
These results are easily rationalized using the discussion above: measuring inter-
ventions using the response of a single variable is more likely to deliver a ‘modest’
result. Given the ‘front loaded’ nature of the responses to anticipated reductions in
the Fed funds rate, this is particularly true for variables at longer forecast horizons.
Because the forward rates are computed using the expectations theory of the term
structure, the n quarter forward rate corresponds to the forecast of the policy instru-
ment n quarters ahead. Inspection of the results in Figures 2 , 3 and 4 reveals that the
policy rate returns close to its baseline path relatively quickly in most cases.
I can also assess whether the experiments are likely to be regarded as modest policy
interventions in terms of their effects on a long-term spot rate by setting the Q matrix
in equation (6) to select a measure of the ten-year rate defined using equation (15),
with N = 40. I construct modesty statistics using this measure of the ten-year rate
for the ‘just identified’ simulations in the left hand panels of Figures 2 , 3 and 4. The
p-values for these statistics are 0.17, 0.04 and 3.5× 10−6 for the one-year, two-year and
55That is, the results are computed from the simulations shown by the dashed red lines in the left
hand panels of those figures.
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Figure 12: P-values for modesty statistics using forward interest rate expectations
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Notes: The chart plots the p-values associated with modesty statistics defined for forward interest rates
at different maturities. The x-axis measures the forward rate maturity in quarters and the y-axis mea-
sures the p-value of the modesty statistic. The results are based on the case in which the desired path
for the policy rate is implemented using shocks that are just-identified (ie Method 1 with n = K).
three-year experiments respectively.
6.2 Specification of agents’ beliefs about monetary policy
My method uses the policy advisor’s model of agent’s beliefs about monetary policy to
assess the plausibility of a policy experiment. For the results to be reliable, the policy
advisor must be satisfied that the specification of agents’ beliefs about monetary pol-
icy is adequate and that the sample period used to estimate the parameters governing
agents’ beliefs represents a stable monetary policy regime. In this section, I assess the
extent to which my results may be sensitive to the baseline specification of agents’ be-
liefs about the behavior of monetary policy. I explore two possible miss-specifications.
First, my choice of sample period may not represent a stable policy regime: for ex-
ample, it is possible that policy behavior as changed systematically as the Chair of the
FOMC has changed over time. Indeed, this may be a particularly relevant concern in
the context of forward guidance. As noted in Section 2, the use of forward guidance
and the methods by which it is implemented have changed over time, which suggests
that it may be inappropriate to treat the post-1984 period as a single regime. To inves-
tigate this issue, I re-estimate the model over a shorter sample period and present the
results in Section 6.2.1.
Second, I examine the sensitivity of the results to the specification of agents’ beliefs
about monetary policy behavior: the reaction function in equation (14) may not be
an adequate description of agents’ beliefs. Indeed, Cu´rdia et al. (2011) show that the
specification of the monetary policy reaction function can have a dramatic effect on the
ability of New Keynesian models to fit the US data. To address this issue requires re-
estimating the model with an alternative specification of the monetary policy reaction
function. Results from doing so are presented in Section 6.2.2.
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6.2.1 Sensitivity to estimation sample
To assess the sensitivity of the results to the estimation sample period, I estimate the
model using a data sample starting in 1996, using the same priors for the parameters
as in the baseline estimation.56 Appendix B presents results from this exercise.
Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B document summary statistics of the posterior
distribution of the parameters. The posterior densities for most of the parameters
describing private sector decision making are broadly in line with the baseline estima-
tion over the full sample.57 For the purposes of the exercise at hand it is useful to focus
on the parameters describing agents’ beliefs about monetary policy. Compared with
the baseline results, estimation using the shorter sample suggests that the Fed funds
rate responds more to the output gap, less to inflation and with (slightly) less inertia.
Moreover, the estimated variances of the policy news shocks (at all horizons) and the
measurement errors for one-year and five-year bond rates are larger when the shorter
sample is used. In addition, the estimated ‘term premia’ on one-year and five-year
bond rates (τ4 and τ20) are noticeably smaller when the shorter sample is used.
Figure 13: Forecasts from model estimated on shorter sample and actual outturns
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Notes: The panels show confidence sets of forecasts generated by the DSGE model estimated using the
shorter data sample (1996–2008), obtained by drawing from the posterior distribution of the estimated
parameters. The past data are shown by the solid black lines and the actual realizations of the data over
the forecast horizon are shown by the dashed red lines.
Figure 13 presents the model-based forecasts using the estimation results based
on the shorter sample. The projections for inflation and GDP growth are somewhat
56Data from 1992 are used as a training sample for the Kalman filter. The sample ends in 2008Q4 as
in the baseline specification.
57There are, of course, some differences. For example, the shorter sample is characterized by higher
wage stickiness and lower persistence of wage markup shocks.
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stronger than the forecasts from the model estimated on the full sample (see Figure
1). In particular, most of the mass of the forecast density for GDP growth lies above
the actual realizations for growth over the forecast horizon. The strong outlook for
growth (and indeed inflation) means that the forecast density for the Fed funds rate
is significantly higher (and more steeply sloped) than the forecasts based on the full
sample estimation. The path for the Fed funds rate rises more steeply despite the fact
that the information set on which the projection is based includes data for longer-term
yields that are very low. This is consistent with the smaller estimated term premia and
larger estimated variances of the measurement errors in the measurement equations
for long-term yields.
Because the projection for the Fed funds rate is rather different than the projection
using the model estimated on the longer sample (Figure 1), I adjust my experiments to
make them more comparable with those in Section 4.4. To do so, I apply the marginal
change in the Fed funds rate generated by the experiments in Section 4.4 to the baseline
projection for the Fed funds rate from the model estimated on the shorter sample. I
focus here on the results for the experiment in which the Fed funds rate is held low for
three years, depicted in Figure 14.58
The left-hand column of Figure 14 shows that holding the Fed funds rate low for
three years generates less extreme effects on growth and inflation than the experiment
presented in Section 4.4 (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, the experiment does not consti-
tute a modest policy intervention at the 5% significance level. The right-hand column
shows that when the experiment is constrained to be modest at the 5% significance
level, the macroeconomic effects are considerably smaller (and in fact resemble the
results based on the model estimated on the full sample presented in Figure 4).
The results in this section illustrate that the extent to which a policy intervention
is modest naturally depends on the policy advisor’s model of private agents’ beliefs
about monetary policy. When the model is estimated over a shorter, more recent,
sample, the parameters of describing private agents’ beliefs about monetary policy
do change somewhat. These changes influence both the baseline projection and the
extent to which a given policy intervention is modest according to the policy advisor’s
model of private agents’ beliefs. Based on my experiments, it seems that a given policy
intervention is more likely to be modest using a variant of the model estimated using
the more recent data. This seems consistent with the finding that, over this sample, the
variances of policy news shocks are estimated to be larger. This is likely to increase the
size of the elements in the Φν matrix that determines the denominator of the modesty
statistic (see equations (8) and (9)).
Nevertheless, many plausible policy interventions of the magnitude studied in re-
cent papers investigating the effects of pegging the interest rate would not be deemed
modest when the model is estimated on the shorter sample. And the results generated
by constraining the policy experiment to be modest are very similar to those obtained
in Section 4.4.
58Results for the one-year and two-year experiments are presented in Appendix B and are consistent
with the discussion that follows. Those results show that the one-year experiment is modest at the
5% significance level, though the two-year experiment is only modest when all policy news shocks are
used.
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Figure 14: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for three years using model
estimated over shorter sample
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Notes: The left and right hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions. In both
columns, the baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the
solid gray line. The left column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for the Fed
funds rate for K = 12 periods is generated using n = K = 12 policy news shocks (‘just identified’,
red dashed lines), implemented using Method 1. The p-value of the modesty statistic associated with
this simulation is reported in the legend. The right column repeats the experiment, but imposes the
additional restriction that the policy intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance
level. Since n = K, Method 3 is used.
6.2.2 Sensitivity to specification of monetary policy behavior
To assess the importance of the policy advisor’s model of agents’ beliefs about mon-
etary policy, I estimate a variant of the model in which the interest rate smoothing
parameter in the monetary policy reaction function (14) is calibrated to zero. Cu´rdia
et al. (2011) find that specifications of New Keynesian models in which the monetary
policy rules features interest rate smoothing fit the US data better than rules without
smoothing. Indeed, the marginal data density of the variant of the model with no in-
terest rate smoothing is -364, compared with -230 for the baseline specification of the
model.
Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B document summary statistics of the posterior
distribution of the parameters. The posterior densities for some of the key parameters
describing private sector decision making differ somewhat those from the baseline
version of the model with interest rate smoothing. In particular, the mean estimates
of the intertemporal consumption elasticity and intratemporal labour supply elastic-
ity are both much larger for the no-smoothing rule variant. Prices and wages are also
much stickier in this variant. Focusing again on the parameters describing agents’ be-
liefs about monetary policy, this variant suggests that the monetary policy response to
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inflation is extremely weak (barely satisfying the Taylor principle). Moreover, the esti-
mated variances of the policy news shocks are substantially larger at several horizons
(contemporaneous, eight quarter ahead and twelve quarter ahead) when the shorter
sample is used. The estimated ‘term premia’ on one-year and five-year bond rates (τ4
and τ20) are noticeably smaller for this variant of the model.
Figure 15 shows an experiment in which the Fed funds rate is held lower for three
years. Again, to make the policy experiments more comparable with those for the
baseline specification of the model, I apply the marginal change in the Fed funds rate
generated by the experiments in Section 4.4 to the baseline projection of the Fed funds
rate from the variant of the model without interest rate smoothing. The results in the
left panel are quite striking. A persistent reduction in the Fed funds rate generates
a sizable and protracted reduction in both growth and inflation. The p-value for the
modesty statistic for these responses is 0.31.
These results demonstrate that the modesty test statistic is just one way to judge
the plausibility of responses to forward guidance simulations. Even though the sim-
ulation is very likely to be a modest policy intervention (at a 30% significance level),
many economists, policy advisors and policymakers would find the results in Figure
15 implausible because the sign of the responses are counterintuitive.59 Mechanically,
it is straightforward to explain these results. Table B.1 shows that the estimated per-
sistence of the policy shock process ρr is extremely high (the mean is almost 0.98).
The most likely explanation for this parameter estimate is that it is helps the model
to match the persistence of the nominal interest rate in the data, given the absence of
an interest rate smoothing coefficient in the monetary policy rule. The presence of a
highly persistent shock to the monetary policy rule can imply that a tightening in pol-
icy (positive policy shock) leads to a fall in the nominal interest rate as an endogenous
reaction to the reduction in activity and inflation induced by the policy tightening.60
In addition, the large variances of the estimated policy shocks (see Table B.2) are
likely to imply that the elements in the Φν matrix are also large. As discussed in Section
6.2.1, Φν determines the denominator of the modesty statistic (see equations (8) and
(9)), so that a “larger” Φν will tend to generate smaller values of the test statistic, for a
given ν¯T vector. Finally, the fact that the estimated variances of policy news shocks are
particularly large at specific horizons implies that the ‘size’ of the Φν matrix changes
with the number of policy shocks used to implement the experiment. An implication
is that, for this variant of the model, experiments in which the Fed funds rate is fixed
for a shorter period are less likely to be deemed modest: see Figures B.5 and B.6 in in
Appendix B. As Figure B.3 demonstrates, this implies that the results for this variant
of the model are particularly sensitive to the specification of the modesty statistic.
Once again, the results of this section highlight the importance of using an ad-
equate specification for private agents’ beliefs about monetary policy. The variant of
the model used in this section fits the data poorly in comparison to the baseline specifi-
cation. The deterioration of fit is one indication that the specification of private agents’
beliefs about policy behavior may be inadequate. So in this case, modesty test statistics
may not provide a reliable assessment of the plausibility of policy simulations.
59Quantitatively, the effects of the policy experiment are very persistent, though they are not unam-
biguously “oversized”.
60See Galı´ (2009, page 51) for an analytical investigation of this result in a prototypical New Keyne-
sian model.
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Figure 15: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for three years using model
with no interest rate smoothing
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Notes: The baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the
solid gray line. A policy experiments in which the path for the Fed funds rate for K = 12 periods is
implemented using n = J = 12 policy news shocks is shown in the dashed red line. The p-value of the
modesty statistic associated with this simulations is reported in the legend.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that simulations of forward guidance should be assessed us-
ing the “modest interventions” approach of Leeper and Zha (2003). I extend work by
Adolfson et al. (2005) that shows how to test whether policy experiments are modest
policy interventions in DSGE models. In particular, I show how to constrain policy
experiment so that it is likely to be regarded as a modest policy intervention. In some
cases it is possible to deliver the desired path for the policy instrument exactly. In other
cases, this may not be feasible (for example when the number of shocks used to imple-
ment the experiment equals the number of periods for which the desired interest rate
path is defined). In those cases, I show how to construct a modest policy intervention
in which the path for the policy instrument is as close as possible to the desired path.
When the implementation of a desired future path for the short-term policy rate is
constrained in this way, the macroeconomic effects are arguably much more plausible.
One interpretation of this implementation is that it constrains the effects of the policy
experiment to be consistent with agents’ beliefs about past monetary policy behav-
ior. This chimes with statements by some central bankers that their forward guidance
policies are not intended to signal a deviation from their past behavior.
My analysis applies to single regime DSGE models in which monetary policy is
assumed to be conducted according to a particular monetary policy rule. Models
that incorporate multiple policy regimes (and an articulation of agents’ probability
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model over the regimes) could provide reliable estimates to policy experiments with-
out recourse to my approach. Until recently, estimation of large scale regime-switching
DSGE models was infeasible. But recent advances by Bianchi and Melosi (2013) among
others suggests that building and estimating such models may be feasible in the near
future.
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A Distributions conditional on an interest rate path
Ex ante, agents expect νT+1 ∼ N (0, I). From Section 3.3, the effect of νT+1 on the
variables of interest is given by:
y˜ ≡ yT+h − ETyt+h = DνT+1
where D = QBh−1Φν .
The effect of the shocks on the policy instrument are given by
r˜ ≡ Rν¯T+1
If
z˜ ≡
[
y˜
r˜
]
then the properties of the multivariate normal distribution mean that z˜ ∼ N (0,Σz˜),
where
Σz˜ =
[
DD′ DR′
RD′ RR′
]
This result leads directly to the distributions of the variables of interest conditional
on a choice of shocks that delivers a particular interest rate path, r¯. Standard properties
of multivariate normal distributions mean that:
y˜| (Rν = r¯ − c) ∼ N
(
DR′ (RR′)−1 (r¯ − c) , DD′ −DR′ (RR′)−1RD′
)
Note that the mean of this distribution can be written as Dν∗, where ν∗ is the so-
lution to the minimization problem solved by Method 1 (unsurprisingly as ν∗ is the
shock vector that is most likely ex ante to deliver the path r¯ − c).
B Results from alternative variants
This Appendix presents results from the model estimated on a shorter sample and
under the restriction that the interest rate smoothing parameter is calibrated to a value
of zero.
Tables B.1 and B.2 present summary statistics from estimation of the two variants
of the model considered in Section 6. The tables present posterior means and 5-th and
95-th percentiles for each variant together with the baseline estimation results (also
presented in the main text).
Figures B.1 and B.2 present estimates of policy experiments using the variants of
the model estimated over the shorter sample. These figures show the effects of holding
the Fed funds rate lower for 4 and 8 quarters respectively. Figure B.3 presents analysis
of the sensitivity of inference based on the specification of the modesty statistic.
Figures B.5 and B.6 present estimates of policy experiments using the variants of
the model estimated using a specification of the monetary policy rule without interest
rate smoothing. These figures show the effects of holding the Fed funds rate lower for
4 and 8 quarters respectively. Figure B.7 presents analysis of the sensitivity of inference
based on the specification of the modesty statistic.
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Table B.1: Comparison of posterior densities of estimated parameters for three variants
Full sample Shorter sample No int rate smoothing
Parameter Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
ϕ 6.514 4.694 8.448 5.935 4.204 7.838 6.304 4.506 8.281
σc 0.9763 0.7355 1.267 1.293 1.019 1.649 1.701 1.467 1.929
λ 0.5809 0.4617 0.6962 0.58 0.4617 0.6926 0.6812 0.6154 0.7453
ξw 0.4324 0.284 0.6211 0.8234 0.7535 0.8792 0.744 0.6767 0.8027
σl 1.436 0.584 2.419 1.638 0.682 2.72 2.201 1.342 3.134
ξp 0.7252 0.6004 0.8531 0.7704 0.6659 0.8571 0.9368 0.9187 0.9508
ιw 0.4517 0.2196 0.701 0.3659 0.1639 0.6064 0.4426 0.2178 0.6822
ιp 0.1517 0.06387 0.2651 0.2608 0.11 0.4674 0.1381 0.04962 0.2641
ψ 0.6619 0.4675 0.8337 0.7144 0.5416 0.8642 0.9105 0.8406 0.9626
Φ 1.528 1.388 1.673 1.624 1.471 1.78 1.306 1.204 1.414
rpi − 1 1.187 0.6704 1.814 0.3939 0.1335 0.7661 0.04512 0.01561 0.0875
ρR 0.8434 0.7727 0.8996 0.8806 0.8285 0.9235 0 – –
ry 0.01518 -0.02132 0.07113 0.1701 0.09897 0.2438 0.1318 0.1037 0.1623
pi 0.6379 0.4894 0.802 0.5575 0.4403 0.6887 0.5988 0.4552 0.7553
100 (β−1 − 1) 0.2296 0.1062 0.3901 0.2199 0.1004 0.3746 0.1448 0.06926 0.2369
L¯ -0.5214 -3.579 2.547 0.1052 -1.744 1.93 -0.4821 -2.147 1.215
γ¯ 0.4568 0.4133 0.4958 0.429 0.3653 0.487 0.06742 -0.0161 0.1495
ρga 0.3962 0.2347 0.5589 0.5456 0.3418 0.7496 0.4389 0.2786 0.601
α 0.1717 0.1341 0.2096 0.2078 0.1637 0.2518 0.2025 0.1632 0.2412
ρa 0.916 0.8732 0.9549 0.8773 0.8096 0.935 0.979 0.9699 0.9857
ρb 0.9842 0.9675 0.996 0.9127 0.8816 0.9405 0.2779 0.09852 0.5573
ρg 0.9756 0.9542 0.9917 0.9566 0.9197 0.9844 0.9145 0.8776 0.9472
ρI 0.636 0.4574 0.8176 0.6441 0.4302 0.8452 0.6493 0.5533 0.7301
ρr 0.6232 0.5336 0.7042 0.7464 0.6221 0.8514 0.9778 0.9706 0.9846
ρp 0.927 0.8115 0.9922 0.728 0.4641 0.8939 0.7379 0.6575 0.8053
ρw 0.9898 0.9812 0.9965 0.4395 0.1911 0.7043 0.6704 0.5101 0.8078
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Table B.2: Comparison of posterior densities of estimated parameters for three variants (continued)
Full sample Shorter sample No int rate smoothing
Parameter Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
µp 0.6838 0.4893 0.8325 0.5659 0.2647 0.8032 0.5703 0.3791 0.7183
µw 0.6258 0.3183 0.8934 0.438 0.1975 0.6829 0.398 0.1575 0.6348
σa 0.3804 0.3336 0.4323 0.4047 0.3398 0.4815 0.3804 0.3363 0.4291
σb 0.02464 0.01529 0.03657 0.05829 0.04092 0.07903 0.2008 0.148 0.2466
σg 0.3866 0.343 0.4367 0.3936 0.3319 0.4676 0.3936 0.3431 0.4526
σI 0.3396 0.2409 0.4551 0.3135 0.2093 0.4462 0.4198 0.3406 0.5115
σp 0.09304 0.07388 0.1133 0.1079 0.07817 0.1409 0.08798 0.06089 0.1131
σw 0.4039 0.3163 0.528 0.3762 0.2935 0.4709 0.2559 0.1996 0.3198
100× σν,0 9.723 8.142 11.6 6.642 5.306 8.2 18.46 16.27 19.85
100× σν,1 2.7 0.7446 4.926 3.67 0.8936 6.827 1.446 0.5284 3.054
100× σν,2 5.024 2.219 6.982 5.464 1.4 8.347 2.094 0.5758 5.403
100× σν,3 3.562 0.8822 5.905 2.127 0.5955 4.925 5.58 0.9686 9.687
100× σν,4 1.432 0.5317 2.965 1.792 0.5582 4.26 1.779 0.5572 4.37
100× σν,5 1.309 0.5181 2.514 1.392 0.5227 2.818 3.62 0.7345 8.355
100× σν,6 1.392 0.5393 2.706 1.475 0.5385 3.054 2.046 0.5797 4.864
100× σν,7 1.507 0.5564 3.045 1.356 0.5233 2.75 1.778 0.5616 4.158
100× σν,8 1.316 0.5114 2.6 1.485 0.5482 3.051 8.035 4.034 11.2
100× σν,9 1.326 0.5197 2.619 1.415 0.5375 2.866 1.676 0.5561 3.851
100× σν,10 1.346 0.5301 2.616 1.386 0.5307 2.757 1.916 0.5667 4.83
100× σν,11 1.778 0.61 3.374 1.419 0.5303 2.918 8.98 6.322 11.81
σme,4 0.02317 0.01588 0.03192 0.02539 0.01686 0.03571 0.02673 0.01727 0.03874
σme,20 0.02918 0.01933 0.04093 0.03881 0.02459 0.05616 0.05541 0.02462 0.1007
τ4 0.04965 0.02479 0.07335 0.01828 -0.008663 0.04463 0.001588 -0.03694 0.03923
τ20 0.2872 0.185 0.3827 0.043 -0.08068 0.161 0.1506 0.03376 0.2622
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Figure B.1: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for one year
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Notes: The left and right hand columns of charts show projections under alternative policy assumptions
using a version of the model estimated over the sample period from 1996 to 2008. The left and right
hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions. In both columns, the baseline
forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the solid gray line. The left
column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for the Fed funds rate for K = 4
periods is generated using n = K = 4 policy news shocks (‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and
n = J = 12 policy news shocks (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines), both implemented using Method 1.
The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with these simulations are reported in the legend. The
right column repeats the experiments, but in each case imposes the additional restriction that the policy
intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance level. Method 2 is used for n = K = 4
(‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and Method 3 for n = J = 12 (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines).
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Figure B.2: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for two years
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Notes: The left and right hand columns of charts show projections under alternative policy assumptions
using a version of the model estimated over the sample period from 1996 to 2008. The left and right
hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions. In both columns, the baseline
forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted in the solid gray line. The left
column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for the Fed funds rate for K = 8
periods is implemented using n = K = 8 policy news shocks (‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and
n = J = 12 policy news shocks (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines), both implemented using Method 1.
The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with these simulations are reported in the legend. The
right column repeats the experiments, but in each case imposes the additional restriction that the policy
intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance level. Method 2 is used for n = K = 8
(‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and Method 3 for n = J = 12 (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines).
Figure B.3: Modesty test statistics for alternative combinations of variables
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Notes: Each panel shows a scatter plot of the p-values associated with modesty tests at different hori-
zons. The x-axis measures the p-value of the test statistic at horizon h = 1 and the y-axis measures the
p-value of the test statistic for horizon h = 4. Each marker type shows the results when a particular
subset of observable variables are chosen for the test: red triangles = 1 variable; blue circles = 2 vari-
ables; green asterixes = 3 variables; black crosses = 4 variables; cyan squares = 5 variables; magenta
diamonds = 6 variables. The panels contain results for the just-identified (Method 1) implementation of
experiments in Figures B.1, B.2 and 14.
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Figure B.4: Forecasts from model without interest rate smoothing and actual outturns
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Notes: The panels show confidence sets of forecasts generated by a variant of the model in which the
interest rate smoothing parameter is fixed to zero. The sets are obtained by drawing from the posterior
distribution of the estimated parameters. Actual outturns over the forecast horizon are shown by the
dashed red lines.
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Figure B.5: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for one year
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Notes: The left and right hand columns of charts show projections under alternative policy assumptions
using a version of the model in which the interest rate smoothing parameter in the reaction function is
calibrated to 0. The left and right hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions.
In both columns, the baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted
in the solid gray line. The left column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for
the Fed funds rate for K = 4 periods is implemented using n = K = 4 policy news shocks (‘just
identified’, red dashed lines) and n = J = 12 policy news shocks (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines), both
implemented using Method 1. The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with these simulations
are reported in the legend. The right column repeats the experiments, but in each case imposes the
additional restriction that the policy intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance
level. Method 2 is used for n = K = 4 (‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and Method 3 for n = J = 12
(‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines).
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Figure B.6: Experiment in which Fed funds rate is held low for two years
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Notes: The left and right hand columns of charts show projections under alternative policy assumptions
using a version of the model in which the interest rate smoothing parameter in the reaction function is
calibrated to 0. The left and right hand columns show projections under alternative policy assumptions.
In both columns, the baseline forecast is plotted in the black solid line and the realized data is plotted
in the solid gray line. The left column shows the results of policy experiments in which the path for
the Fed funds rate for K = 8 periods is implemented using n = K = 8 policy news shocks (‘just
identified’, red dashed lines) and n = J = 12 policy news shocks (‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines), both
implemented using Method 1. The p-value of the modesty statistics associated with these simulations
are reported in the legend. The right column repeats the experiments, but in each case imposes the
additional restriction that the policy intervention be considered modest at the p = 0.05 significance
level. Method 2 is used for n = K = 8 (‘just identified’, red dashed lines) and Method 3 for n = J = 12
(‘all shocks’, blue dotted lines).
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Figure B.7: Modesty test statistics for alternative combinations of variables
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Notes: Each panel shows a scatter plot of the p-values associated with modesty tests at different hori-
zons, for policy experiments using a version of the model in which the interest rate smoothing param-
eter is calibrated to zero. The x-axis measures the p-value of the test statistic at horizon h = 1 and the
y-axis measures the p-value of the test statistic for horizon h = 4. Each marker type shows the results
when a particular subset of observable variables are chosen for the test: red triangles = 1 variable; blue
circles = 2 variables; green asterixes = 3 variables; black crosses = 4 variables; cyan squares = 5 vari-
ables; magenta diamonds = 6 variables. The panels contain results for the just-identified (Method 1)
implementation of experiments in Figures B.5, B.6 and 15.
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